FOR COURT USE ONLY
BANKRUPTCY COURT IA - SANTA ANA DIVISION
CASE NUMBER: 8:21-bk-11710-SC ADVERSARY NUMBER: 8:21-ap-010960-SC CHAPTER: 7
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER LBR 7055-1
DATE: 01/11/2023 TIME: 11:00 am COURTROOM: 5C - Virtual ADDRESS: Ronald Reagan Fed Bldg and Courthouse 411 West Fourth Street Santa Ana, CA 92701

1.	Name of Defendant(s) against whom default judgment is sought (specify name): J-Pad, LLC and		
	J-Sandcastle Co LLC		
2.	Plaintiff filed the complaint in the above-captioned proceeding on (specify date): 11/16/2021		
3.	The Summons and Complaint were served on Defendant by  personal service  mail service on the following date ( <i>specify date</i> ): 11/22/2021		
4.	A true and correct copy of the completed return of summons form is attached.		

"Bankruptcy Code" and "11 U.S.C." refer to the United States Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code.
"FRBP" refers to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. "LBR" and "LBRs" refer to the Local Bankruptcy Rule(s) of this court.

5.	The tim	ne for filing an answer or other response expired on ( <i>specify date</i> ): 12/20/2021
6.	No ans	wer or other response has been filed or served by Defendant.
7.	The de	fault of Defendant:
	a. 🗌	Has not yet been entered, but is requested
	b. 🗵	Was entered on (specify date): 11/02/2022
8.	A Stati	us Conference:
	a. 🗵	Is scheduled for (specify date, time, and place): February 14, 2023
	b. 🗌	Was held on (specify date, time, and place):
9.	As prod	of that Plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested in the complaint, Plaintiff:
	a. 🗵	Relies on the complaint and attached documents.
	b. 🗵	Attaches the following documents to establish a prima facie case:
	(1)	☑ Declaration of (specify): Janine Jasso ISO of Mtn & Exhibits, Filed concurrently herewith
	(2)	☐ Declaration of (specify):
	(3)	☑ Other (specify): Plaintiff's Brief in support of Plaintiff's Notice of Motion and Motion
10.	As furth	ner support for entry of a default judgment, Plaintiff submits a memorandum of points and authorities (optional).
11.	4043)).	ARATION OF NON-MILITARY STATUS (Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. chapter 50 (§§ 3901- The undersigned party or counsel declares under penalty of perjury, with respect to each Defendant against a default judgment is sought by this motion:
	a. 🗵	Defendant is not currently in military service. The facts that support this statement are as follows (see the court's website for information about how to verify non-military status):  The Defendants are corporations, specifically California limited liability companies
	b. 🗌	Defendant is currently in military service. The facts that support this statement are as follows ( <i>if this box is checked, the plaintiff must attach a supplement to this motion addressing the requirements in 50 U.S.C.</i> § 3931(b)(2) to appoint an attorney for the Defendant before entering a judgment):
	c. 🗌	I am unable to determine whether or not Defendant is in military service. The facts that support this statement are as follows (if this box is checked, the plaintiff must attach a supplement to this motion addressing the bond requirement in 50 U.S.C. § 3931(b)(3)):

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12. Defaulting party is not an infant or incompetent party.

Plaintiff requests that this court enter a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff. A copy of the lodged proposed default judgment is attached.

Date: 12/29/2022

Respectfully submitted,

Printed name of law firm

Signature

Janine Jasso

Name of Attorney for Plaintiff or Plaintiff

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Sandcastle Co LLC (the "Motion"). Plaintiff also submits the concurrently filed Declaration of 1 2 Janine Jasso ("Jasso Decl.") in support of the Motion. 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS 4 5 6 7 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY ....... 8 9 **B. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT**......10 10 11 C. FINDING OF FACT IN FAVOR OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT.....14 12 1. Chronology of the Debtor and Defendant LLCs Acts Related to The FAC's 13 14 a. Facts Related to the Concealed Transfer of the 4476 Alderport 15 2. Facts Related to Debtor Transferring and Concealing Funds for Personal 16 17 Use in the Defendant JSC LLC and Defendant JP LLC to Prevent Collection 18 of Debtor's assets by Plaintiff. ......38 19 a. Facts Related to Debtor's Transfer of Personal Funds from Her Concealed 20 Transfer of the 4476 Alderport Condo to Mr. Nickel Starting on October 31, 21 2018 through July 9, 2021, the Date of Debtor's Bankruptcy Petition......39 b. Paragraphs 103-107 relate to Debtor's movement of \$366,600, leaving 22 23 \$100 in the Debtor's Personal Chase PCS #7891 on November 3, 2018. ....41 24 c. Paragraphs 108-115 relate to Debtor's movement of \$355,000, leaving 25 \$0 in the Debtor's Personal Chase PCC #0186 on November 8, 2018. .....42 26 d. Paragraphs 116-163 relate to Debtor's movement of \$355,000 funds 27 Debtor into Debtor's Alter Ego, Defendant JSC LLC's Chase #7860 28

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8	Debtor's Alter Ego, Defendant JSC LLC, then transferred to Debtor's personal
9   10	Fidelity IRA, then transferred back to Defendant JSC LLC, then moved into a
11	cashier's check payable to Debtor's Alter Ego, Defendant JP LLC to open JP
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27	which helps Debtor hinder creditors collecting an asset
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## I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff's sued Debtor and Defendants, J-Pad, LLC ("JP LLC") and J-Sandcastle Co LLC ("JSC LLC") (collectively "Defendant LLCs") in this adversary proceeding requesting the non-dischargeability of Plaintiff's second civil judgment listed in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC" and "DK 6"), the operative pleading, and attached the judgments to the FAC DK 6 Exhibit ("Ex.") 3 and 4 under §523(a)(2)(A) actual fraud causes of action. Plaintiff also requested the denial of discharge under §727(a)(3), §727(a)(4), and §727(a)(5) causes of action related to Debtor's use of Defendant LLCs as her alter egos to conceal Debtor's financial condition, make false oaths and avoid explaining the deficiency of Debtor's assets available to meet Debtor's liabilities. By this Motion, Plaintiff seeks the entry of default judgment of Defendant JP LLC and Defendant JSC LLC. Plaintiff does not seek actual damages in this Motion. Plaintiff requests findings of fact and the equitable solution of reverse piercing of the Defendant LLCs corporate veils and adding Defendant LLCs as additional judgment debtors to Plaintiff's judgments pursuant to Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5<sup>th</sup> 214, 221, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 847 ("Curci").

## II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As more fully described in Plaintiff's FAC DK 6, the Debtor, Jamie Lynn Gallian ("Debtor") created and used her wholly-owned, single member Defendant LLCs as alter-egos from October 2018 through Debtor's petition for bankruptcy, July 9, 2021 to effectuate a series of concealed fraudulent transfers to hinder or delay or defraud Debtor's creditors which began with the transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo on October 31, 2018 on the eve of the Plaintiff's civil motion for attorney's fees and costs as a result of Debtor's dismissal of her civil complaint against Plaintiff and the other HOA Board members. The Debtor received \$379,000 from the transferee, Mr. Nickel, on October 31, 2018 in a concealed exchange for the 4476 Alderport condo, to avoid

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paying the Debtor's debts to the Plaintiff and the HOA. This was the first voidable transfer. Then, on October 31, 2018, Debtor deposited \$366,600 of \$379,000 in her JP Morgan Chase Personal Savings account and began immediately moved the cash into and out friends accounts, into cashier's checks and then, starting November 7, 2018, into and out of the Defendant LLCs bank accounts via cashiers checks and wires to hide the cash in the single-member Defendant LLCs, which had no business activity or third-party creditors.

Plaintiff will show that the Debtor has 100% ownership of the single-member Defendant LLCs since their inception on October 18, 2018. [See FAC ¶44, DK 29]. Debtor admitted on her bankruptcy petition that JSC LLC is her 100% owned, single-member limited liability company since its inception on October 18, 2018. FAC DK 6 ¶44, Debtor Answer DK 13 ¶44. In Debtor's subsequent bankruptcy corporate ownership statement filed in this case on March 16, 2022, Debtor admitted that JP LLC is also her 100% owned, single-member limited liability company since she became its sole owner on October 18, 2018. Debtor further admitted that Defendant LLCs have not conducted any business. [See DK 29]. There is substantial evidence of a unity of interest between Debtor and the Defendant LLCs and failing to add the Defendant LLCs to the judgments would create an unjust result.

Plaintiff was injured by the Defendant LLCs which Debtor used to do ongoing fraudulent transfers to hinder, delay and/or defraud Plaintiff from collecting the civil judgment ordered since 2018, Exhibit 4, in the amount of approximately \$67,550.65 (the civil judgment plus interest), which is the original judgment debt, plus interest. [Jasso Decl. ¶4]. The criminal restitution judgment was ordered non-dischargeable pursuant to Plaintiff FAC's First Cause of Action on December 19, 2022. [DK 85]. The criminal restitution judgment debt is approximately \$14,630 (the criminal restitution judgment plus interest), is incorporated by reference in the FAC's Claims 2-5. These judgments are included in this default judgment motion to add the Defendant LLCs as

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additional debtors to this judgment as well. [Jasso Decl. ¶4]. Defendant LLCs were used by Debtor to facilitate concealment of her personal assets in the Defendant LLCs, facilitate false paths in Debtor's bankruptcy petition regarding her personal, collectable assets hidden in the Defendant LLCs, and facilitate Debtor's personal use of the assets causing Defendant LLCs loss and deficiency of Debtor's personal assets.

#### III. **DEFAULT JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE HERE**

### A. JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this adversary proceeding is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. §157(b).

The FAC is brought pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523 and § 727. [DK 6]

## B. STANDARD FOR JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT

Rule 55 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), made applicable to this proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7055, provides that the Court may enter judgment by default upon application of the party entitled to the default. It provides in pertinent part:

- (a) Entering a Default. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default.
- (b) Entering a Default Judgment.
  - (1) By the Clerk. If the plaintiff's claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can be made certain by computation, the clerk—on the plaintiff's request, with an affidavit showing the amount due—must enter judgment for that amount and costs against a defendant who has been defaulted for not appearing and who is neither a minor nor an incompetent person.
  - (2) By the Court. In all other cases, the party must apply to the court for a default judgment. A default judgment may be entered against a minor or incompetent person only if represented by a general guardian, conservator, or other like fiduciary who has appeared. If the party against whom a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that party or its representative must be served with written notice of the application at least 7 days before the hearing. The court may conduct hearings or make referrals—preserving any federal statutory right to a jury trial—when, to enter or effectuate judgment, it needs to

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(A) conduct an accounting;

(B) determine the amount of damages;

- (C) establish the truth of any allegation by evidence; or
- (D) investigate any other matter.

To obtain a default judgment, a two-step process is required: (1) an entry of default (typically by the clerk of court); and (2) a judgment by default. Cashco Fin. Servs. v. McGee (In re McGee), 359 B.R. 764, 770 (9th Cir. BAP 2006) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) and (b) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7055). Here, the Plaintiff has satisfied the first step as the Court has entered default against Defendant J-Sandcastle Co LLC and Defendant J-Pad, LLC [Dockets 55-56].

Regarding the second step, on a motion for default judgment, the "[w]ell-pleaded allegations are taken as admitted on a default judgment." Benny v. Piper, 799 F.2d 489, 495 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). Evidence supporting such factual allegations is not required. See Fong v. U.S., 300 F.2d 400, 409 (because of the "default order, no further supporting evidence was required."). Moreover, in granting default judgments, courts are not required to make detailed findings of fact. See Fair Housing of Marin v. Combs (In re Combs), 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 2002).

"The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true." Sharma v. Salcido (In re Sharma, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2286, at \*20-21 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. May 14, 2013) (quoting Televideo Sys., 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, "a prove-up hearing is only required where the damages are unliquidated or not capable of mathematical calculation. FRCP 55(b) does not require a hearing to investigate facts not related to damages, since the default itself establishes those facts as alleged in the complaint." *In re Sharma*, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2286 at \*22 (citing Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 1981); *Televideo Sys.*, 826 F.2d at 917-18).

In this case, the allegations in the FAC set out the facts that on the eve of the civil court granting Plaintiff's and the other Board members motion for attorney's fees for Debtor's vexatious, out-of-control fraudulent litigation tactics designed to try and grift property rights that did not (and still do not) exist, Debtor transferred the 4476 Alderport condo to Mr. Nickel on

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October 30, 2018 and again on October 31, 2018 in a concealed fraudulent transfer scheme transferring "fee" ownership interests to Mr. Nickel for \$379,000, at a time when Debtor refused to comply with discovery to avoid having to confess to her fraudulent litigation, had not been paying her litigation debts, grifted \$3,672.89 off of Bank of America, and had a total of \$1,118.11 immediately preceding the transfer. After receiving the cashier's checks from Mr. Nickel, Debtor continued making fraudulent concealed transfers of money from her personal account, i.e., hiding funds from creditors in and out of the Defendant LLCs' bank accounts and in and out of a nonqualified personal Fidelity IRA account, transferring funds hidden in Defendant JSC LLC to her associate, Lisa Ryan, on November 16, 2018 via three cashier's checks totaling \$150,000 in order for Defendant to purchase a mobile home in the name of Defendant JSC LLC in another concealed transfer. After filing for bankruptcy, Debtor lied to the Trustee claiming she paid Lisa Ryan \$170,000 in cashier's checks and 10,000 in cash, and Debtor lied on her subsequent bankruptcy schedules about her fabricated February 25, 2021 back-dated transfer of the mobile home title from JSC LLC to herself. As the documents slowly revealed, Debtor went to great lengths, using a stack of cashier's checks and wire transfers between several financial institutions to

- use the Defendant LLCs to claim indigency and obtain a state public defender and public appellate attorney regarding Criminal Case 18WM05278 in which Plaintiff was one of her victims, and
- lie on her bankruptcy schedules filed repeatedly to hide assets in the Defendant LLCs, and
- to use Defendant LLCs to pay Debtor's personal expenses including bail, criminal court fines, court appellate costs, attorneys to continue vexatious litigation, car payments, groceries, restaurants, cell phone, and withdraw cash with funds that would have been available to collect if the funds were not hidden in the Defendant LLCs.

The Plaintiff's allegations are well pled and straightforward. By this Brief, Plaintiff supplements the FAC with the Declaration of Janine Jasso filed concurrently herewith, providing further support for liability. Therefore, the Court should enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff

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27 28 be denied discharge under Sections 727(a)(3), 727(a)(4) and 727(a)(5). The Plaintiff is not seeking compensatory damages in this default judgment. Plaintiff submits that by entering default judgment against each Defendant JP LLC and JSC LLC, the Court may enter the following equitable, non-compensatory relief:

523(a)(2)(A), and Defendant LLCs and Debtor are one and the same such that the Debtor should

based on the facts established in the FAC that the debts are non-dischargeable under Section

- (1) Findings of facts related to the Debtor's California single-member Defendant LLCs as listed below;
- (2) Finding that Plaintiff has met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant LLCs meet the legal definition of alter egos of Debtor, under Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5<sup>th</sup> 214, 221, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 847;
- (3) Finding that as an equitable resolution provided by *Curci* case law, which is known as outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil of the Defendant J-Sandcastle Co LLC, the Defendant J-Sandcastle Co LLC is added an additional judgment debtor of Plaintiff's criminal and civil judgments;
- (4) Finding that as an equitable resolution provided by *Curci* case law, which is known as outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil of the Defendant J-Pad LLC, the Defendant J-Pad LLC is added as an additional judgment debtor of Plaintiff's criminal and civil judgments;
- (5) Finding that as Debtor and the Defendant LLCs are one and the same under the reverse veil piercing type of alter-ego equitable solution, the debts owed Plaintiff are not dischargeable 523(a)(2)(A) and a denial of discharge under Sections 727(a)(3), 727(a)(4) and 727(a)(5) is appropriate for Debtor through use of the Defendant LLCs;
- (6) Finding that Plaintiff is entitled to collect the judgments against assets of the Defendant LLCs that are not bankruptcy estate assets, meaning that the Defendant LLCs' asset did not exist prior to the original petition date; and

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(7) Finding the Plaintiff is also entitled to collect the judgments against Defendant LLCs' assets that have been abandoned by the Trustee or are abandoned in the future by the Trustee.

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## C. FINDING OF FACT IN FAVOR OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT

- Debtor filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition on July 9, 2021 in pro se under United States
   Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §101, et seq, Case No. 8:21-bk-11710-SC, [Official Docket No. 1].
   Jeffrey Golden was appointed Trustee.
- 3. The convicted Debtor scheduled the State of California criminal victim restitution order and judgment under OCSC Criminal Case No. 18WM05278 which the criminal court ordered her to pay Plaintiff as a condition of her probation for violating the restraining order protecting me and my family from no contact. [FAC DK 6, ¶23-27, Ex. 3; Official Docket No. 1, Schedule E/F, Item 4.17]. On December 13, 2022 at the hearing on the merits, the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [DK 47] on the FAC First Cause of Action for non-dischargeability of a state criminal restitution order under 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(7), and the Court's written order was filed on December 19, 2022 and served on December 22, 2022. [DKs 84,85].

  4. Debtor also scheduled Plaintiff's civil court judgment owed under OCSC Case No. 30-2017-00913985, The Huntington Beach Gables Homeowners Association ("HOA") v. Bradley, Gallian, et al. [FAC DK 6 ¶29-30, Ex. 4; Official Docket No. 1, Schedule D, Item 2.7, Schedule E/F 4.6].

  5. As more fully described in the Procedural History, above, on November 2, 2022, the Court

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# 1. Chronology of the Debtor and Defendant LLCs Acts Related to The FAC's Claims 2-5

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a. Facts Related to the Concealed Transfer of the 4476 Alderport Condo

- 24 6. Plaintiff at all relevant times mentioned herein, was a homeowner and Board Member of The
  - Huntington Beach Gables Homeowners Association ("Association" or "HOA"). [FAC DK 6 ¶12].

entered the defaults of Defendant J-Pad, LLC and Defendant J-Sandcastle Co, LLC. [DKs 55,56].

- 26 | 7. Debtor became the Sublessee of record of the property located at 4476 Alderport Drive, Unit
- 27 | 53, Huntington Beach, CA 92649 ("4476 Alderport condo") on or about March 22, 2017, by way
  - of a recorded Assignment of Condominium Sublease ("Sublease"). The prior owner, Sandra

1	Bradley, was a member of the Association and Debtor's former stepmother by way of being the
2	widow of Debtor's former stepfather. [FAC DK 6 ¶13].
3	8. The 4476 Alderport condo is one of only 80 an air-space condominiums located within this tiny
4	Association. The Association is located within two miles of Sunset Beach and less than a mile
5	from Huntington Harbor. The Association is a very small, non-profit organization with very low
6	monthly dues. The owners purchase a triple-net sublease of a unit, which is a contract of adhesion
7	for a term of years, like renting a commercial space in a mall, requiring the sublessee to pay rent to
8	a separate landlord, BS Investors, the property taxes and hoa assessments to the Association. The
9	Association is a very close-knit community, where residents know their neighbors as their friends.
10	The residents take care of the inside of their condos and patios, and the Association maintains
11	everything outside, i.e. the common area. [FAC DK 6 ¶14].
12	9. Only the Association and condominiums are located on the Orange County, California real
13	estate Tract 10542. The Condominium Plan for the entire tract is recorded with Orange County
14	Recorder's office as Book 13358 Page 1193, as Instrument No. 28814. [FAC DK 6 ¶12 and its
15	Exhibit 1].
16	10. No Rancho Del Rey mobile homes are located on the same real estate tract as the Association.
17	[FAC DK 6 ¶15, and its Exhibit 1, Jasso Decl. ¶12, Ex. 2, pp. 273-276, OC Assessor's Maps].
18	11. The Sublessee of every unit within the Association is subject to compliance with the
19	provisions of various governing documents, including but not limited to, the "Declaration of
20	Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for The Huntington Beach Gables," recorded on May 28,
21	1980 as file/document number 80-28926 ("CC&Rs"), Rules and Regulations adopted by the Board
22	on August 26, 2003, and the Condominium Plan recorded on October 18, 1979 as Book 13358
23	Page 1193, as Instrument No. 28814. [FAC DK 6 ¶16 and the CC&R's attached as its Ex. 2].
24	12. The CC&Rs create and establish the Association as the governing body for the management,
25	administration, and operation of the Association. California Civil Code section 5975, subdivision
26	(a) provides in part:
27	The covenants and restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable
28	equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development.

against her victims. Because of the recorded CC&Rs, Plaintiff became a creditor of Debtor's and

against the HOA and the volunteer Board members, based on her purported claim of fee simple

ownership and her purported claim, without proof, that HOA did not exist on the premises. The

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owners of BS Investors won their motion to quash. [Jasso Decl. ¶14, Ex. 4, p.381]. 20. In the Enforcement Lawsuit, Debtor's unprovable, false cross-claims that the condominium sublease was a fee ownership of a townhome in a PUD was not a legitimate, honest dispute. Mrs. Bradley testified that Debtor had paid the sublease rental payment to BS Investors, the HOA dues, and property taxes, which are conditions of the triple-net condominium sublease payments. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 13, Ex. 3, p. 286, lines 14-25]. 21. Furthermore, sublessees and the HOA had already proven in the 2000 civil litigation defending the suit brought by BS Investors and Houser Bros Co., OC Case No. 00CC09649, that Houser Bros. Co. owned the property in fee simple. [Jasso Decl. ¶15, Ex. 5, p. 382, lines 18-19, the 2002] trial brief]. One of the critical issues put to the court in the 2000 case was whether the property could be converted by the sublessees into a higher, best use, such as converting the condominiums into fee simple townhomes or single-family homes or removing everything on the property and building a commercial enterprise. The sublessees and the HOA proved that the sublesses are contracts of adhesion and thus the condominiums could never be changed without the landlord's written permission. Id. at p. 13, lines 5-10 and p. 18, line 17 to p.19, line 20. The sublessees argued successfully that all 80 sublessees had no right to unilaterally modify the footprints of the units or anything on the property. The sublessor, BS Investors, and BS Investor's ground lessor, Houser Bros. Co then settled the lawsuit creating a 2003 First Amendment to the subleases which tied the annual rental increase to the CPI index with a 7% cap. [Jasso Decl. ¶¶ 7, 35, Ex. 24]. 22. As proven in the 2000 case, a sublet condominium under a Condominium Plan is not the same as owning a townhome in a Planned Unit Development ("PUD"). In California, a townhouse is the ownership equivalent of a single-family home, with real property ownership of the building, ground underneath and the air above the townhome in fee simple. Furthermore, due to the

proximity to Sunset Beach and Huntington Harbor, townhomes located within a block of this HOA were bought and sold in 2018 between \$650,000 -\$800,000. Debtor's condo, based on the fair market value price per square foot of a townhome of approximate based on the sales of townhomes next to the HOA in 2018, would have been \$600,000, if the 4476 Alderport condo was a townhome. Today, the sublet condo would be nearly \$800,000 if it was a townhome. After failing to prove fee simple ownership of ground underneath the 4476 Alderport condo, which is in fact the common area, Debtor and Mr. Nickel created and signed an under-the-table transfer document that conveyed the condo with a remainder interest in the ground in fee by first unilaterally cancelling the Houser Bros Co-BSI ground lease. This meant that Mr. Nickel's purported purchase price of \$379,000 was substantially less (47.37%) than the fair market value of their purported townhome in the HOA. [Jasso Decl. ¶16, Ex. 6, p. 419, lines 19-27 and its Ex. E pp. 431-432 (comparative sales of townhomes within 1 block), and its Ex. B, p.424-425, photos of the HOA condominium complex].

On or about October 14, 2021, Debtor filed third amended schedules, claiming personal ownership of the JSC mobile home and the ground underneath the mobile home in fee simple.

Debtor admitted that, if true, the mobile home value would necessarily increase in value to well over \$900,000 based on recent sales of single homes adjacent to JSC's mobile home. This shows

Debtor's intent to continue her pattern of false and vexatious bankruptcy tactics in order to illicit someone else's property. [FAC DK 6 ¶69, Answer DK 13 ¶69].

Notably, this Court has already been subjected to Debtor's vexatious litigation tactic to illicitly gain money. For example: the Debtor listed a California Covid-19 Rent Program check as an exempt asset. The creditor Houser Bros Co., who owns the mobile home park, filed an Interpleader, OCSC Case No. 30-2021-01236940-CL-MC-CJC, proving no tenancy exists between Debtor and Houser Bros Co., thereby proving that the Debtor had no right to California's Covid-19

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documents. The court ordered Debtor, and any of her associates, employees, guests and tenants to comply with the TRO and PI in order to protect the Association and its vendors from further harm

Rent Program funds. This Court found no basis for granting Debtor's ex parte motion for the California's Covid-19 Rent funds of approximately \$25,000 to be applied to rent to Houser Bros or to force Houser Bros to accept rent check payments. See DK 14, Houser Bros. v. Gallian, Adversary Case 8:21-ap-01097-ES. Based on the above, Debtor attempted to illicitly claim California Covid-19 rent program funds based on a lie. 23. Debtor's apparent plan to unilaterally take ownership of the HOA condominiums in fee simple, including Houser Bros. Co's actual fee ownership of the ground, included making this false "townhome in a PUD" claim throughout her protracted pro per litigation against Plaintiff, the other Board members, and the HOA by out-of-control litigation tactics designed to avoid discovery rules and cause financial rape of all of the litigation victims who can do nothing to stop her destruction of the property without the court's help. For example, during the course of the Enforcement Lawsuit, the Debtor continued to refuse to comply with the governing documents, doubled-down by increasing her unsafe nuisance activities affecting all the residents in the common area, causing the homeowners to complain even more about the Debtor and threaten litigation against the Board members. Her nuisance activity in the common area caused the Association's insurance and legal fees to increase as well. As a result, the Court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") in September 2017 and a preliminary injunction ("PI") in January 2018. [FAC DK 6 ¶21]. 24. As part of the court the TRO and PI legal proceedings against the Debtor, the state court determined that Debtor was the owner of the 4476 Alderport condominium airspace parcel and that the Association's common area included all of the property in the Association exterior to the condominium, from the walls of each condominium out. The court reviewed the governing

brief filed in multiple court cases in 2021. In it, Debtor (falsely) claimed that Plaintiff and my

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daughter were not her victims, were not entitled to state victim restitution, and that Plaintiff illegally recorded the restitution abstract of judgment issued by the Criminal Court as provided above. Debtor projected Debtor's own fraud onto Plaintiff, as Debtor's retaliatory claims against Plaintiff and my daughter were denied by the criminal court, the civil restraining order court, the California Criminal Appellate Court and the Civil Court of Appeals for the 4<sup>th</sup> District. [FAC DK 6 ¶28; Debtor's Admission in Answer DK 13, p.4, ¶28]. 29. In July 2018, the Debtor successfully fought the oral settlement that was put on the record with the HOA and Board members, to *prevent* the sale of her condo sublease via escrow which was a material term of the settlement. The state court warned Debtor that by winning her opposition to the HOA's motion, she would be subject to all of the civil procedure requirements and could end up with legal fees awarded against her. [Jasso Decl. ¶¶7, 30, Ex. 20A, p.826, lines 15-17]. 30. Another example of Debtor's fabricated litigation tactics: Instead of complying with discovery requests in which the HOA was trying to determine what proof she had for any of her claims against the HOA, Debtor filed another ex parte motion for a restraining order against the HOA under the name, caption and bar license number of her attorney without his permission. When he discovered the Debtor's filing, Mr. Flyer notified the court to take it off calendar. The court did so and admonished Debtor for fraud. [Jasso Decl. ¶18, Ex. 8, p. 439 court minute order dtd 09.07.18]. 31. The HOA moved to compel discovery. On September 27, 2018, after the court found that the Debtor was unwilling to live up to the terms of the settlement, the court ordered discovery sanctions against the Debtor for her ongoing violation of court-ordered discovery. She did not pay the sanctions of \$3070, which were due on October 27, 2018. The state court then ordered the abstract of judgment on November 16, 2018 [Jasso Decl. ¶19,20, Ex. 9, p.443, first full paragraph of 9.27.18 court minute order, Ex. 10, pp. 445-447, Discovery sanctions judgment].

32. In connection with this discovery sanction, Mr. Flyer warned her in August 2018 that she had to comply with court-ordered discovery or face sanctions and possibly losing her condo sublease. [Jasso Decl. ¶21, Ex. 11, p. 449-450].

33. After a properly noticed motion for attorney's fees on August 7, 2018 scheduled to be heard on November 1, 2018, the court issued a tentative ruling on October 31, 2018 in favor of Plaintiff and the other Board members. On November 1, 2018, the Court held its scheduled hearing and found in favor of Plaintiff and the other Board members on the merits, issuing a final order of \$46,138 plus 10 percent interest per annum, on November 8, 2018. The Debtor did not pay the court judgment, and an Abstract of Judgment was issued and recorded at the Orange County Recorder's office on December 14, 2018. [FAC DK 6 ¶30 and its Exhibit 4].

34. Debtor immediately appealed, and the court's order was affirmed on September 15, 2020, California 4<sup>th</sup> Appellate District Division 3, Case No. G058198. The appellate court's opinion shows the Board in good faith tried to settle with the Debtor to help stop Debtor's vexatious litigation. [Jasso Decl. ¶22, Ex. 12, p. 454, 7<sup>th</sup> full paragraph, last five sentences, footnote one lists the board members, including Plaintiff].

35. Also, on August 13, 2018, with the approval of the landlord, BS Investors, the HOA approved recording a written lien with the OC Recorder's office on the 4476 Alderport Condo sublease for the unpaid delinquent HOA special assessments. [Jasso Decl. ¶23, Ex. 13 pp. 456-477].

36. As indicated in Paragraph 24, *supra*, the state court's PI enjoined Debtor and all of Debtor's associates, which included anyone acting for Debtor including any real estate agent, potential buyer or escrow agent of the 4476 Alderport condo from contacting the HOA members, volunteers **and management** regarding the litigation. This PI therefore required Debtor's associates to contact the HOA attorneys that were listed on the PI with their names, address and phone number regarding any matter related to the HOA litigation, including HOA escrow disclosures and

demands as the information necessarily including the ongoing HOA litigation. [Jasso Decl. ¶17, Ex. 7, p. 434-437, copy of PI, para. 9].

37. In September 2018, Debtor's escrow agent, Cheryl Shoats of Eminence Escrow, contacted the HOA attorneys on behalf of Debtor asking for HOA litigation information for a potential buyer of the 4476 Alderport condo unrelated to Mr. Nickel, in compliance with the court's PI. As a nonprofit homeowner's association, our HOA could only give a potential buyer the litigation disclosure letters, audited financials and board minutes, which discussed the ongoing through the HOA attorney to Debtor's licensed escrow agent in compliance with the PI. This process which all hoa's must follow, protected the HOA from any claim by a seller that the HOA intentionally interfered with a prospective economic advantage under state law. [Jasso Decl. ¶¶23, 24 Ex. 13, pp.457-460, and Ex. 14, pp. 479-482 (four HOA litigation disclosure letters from 2017 to 2019)].

38. On October 10, 2018, Debtor's landlord, BS Investors, filed its unlawful detainer suit against Debtor after posting eviction notices to Debtor and all occupants in August 2018 that she was being evicted for nonpayment of the HOA's special assessments, which resulted in Debtor defaulting on her condominium sublease and which never cured. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 7, see also OCSC 30-2018-01024401].

39. On October 18, 2018, Debtor obtained 100% ownership interest in her single-member California limited liability company, Defendant JP LLC. To create red herrings for the Trustee and the creditors, Debtor made false claims about her percentage of ownership in her original and subsequent bankruptcy schedules prior to Debtor's Answer of Plaintiff's FAC. [DK 29, FAC DK 6, ¶43,66, and 101; *see also* Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, pp. 38-40, Debtor's bk schedules chart, and Item 19 on pp. 53, 64, 72, 83, and Jasso Decl. ¶82, Ex. 70, p. 1364, lines 11-15, Debtor admission she has been 100% owner of Defendant JP LLC since 10.18.18 (Deposition of Jamie Gallian,

Houser v Gallian 11710 06.28.22)].

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40. In addition, on October 18, 2018, Debtor created her 100% ownership interest in her singlemember California limited liability company, Defendant JSC LLC. [DK 29 and FAC DK 6 ¶ 44].

41. After several weeks with no contact by Ms. Shoats, the escrow agent emailed the HOA attorneys on October 25, 2018 regarding a purported escrow information request sent by Debtor to the HOA management company in violation of the PI. The HOA attorney, Joyce Kapsal, responded on October 29, 2018, notifying Ms. Shoats that on October 26, 2018, Debtor informed the HOA attorney at court that there was no escrow due to the buyer backing out of the escrow because of the ongoing HOA litigation and to advise regarding the status of the escrow. Ms. Shoats later admitted to Plaintiff that there was no escrow for Debtor and Mr. Nickel. [Jasso Decl. ¶¶7, 25, Ex. 15, pp.487-498, Shoats-Kapsal 10.25-10.29.18 emails].

42. On October 30, 2018, Ms. Gallian and Mr. Nickel met at the 4476 Alderport condo for the first time and spent up to six hours together. Mr. Nickel signed the assignment of the sublease from Defendant JP LLC at his Chase bank and gave Debtor \$379,000 in cashier's checks payable to Defendant JP LLC. [Jasso Decl.¶26, Ex. 16, p.502, lines 3-5, p. 504, lines 10-20, p.507, lines 19-25, Nickel 3-16-21 deposition].

43. Mr. Nickel met Debtor again on October 31, 2018 at his Chase bank in Riverside. Mr. Nickel signed papers and gave Debtor two cashier's checks for a total of \$379,000. After the purchase of the condo sublease, Mr. Nickel asked his banker to have someone check on the title and was told it was clear. He never did any research himself. [Jasso Decl.¶ 26, Ex. 16, p.508, lines 17-19, p. 510, line 17 - p. 511, line 9].

44. As provided in Paragraph 33 above, on November 1, 2018, the state court granted the motion for attorney's fees and made the order final on November 8, 2018. [FAC DK 6 ¶30 and its Ex. 4]. 45. Prior to the 4476 Aldeport condo purchase, Mr. Nickel always used a real estate agent or attorney for his prior California purchases of property located in homeowner's associations. [Jasso Decl. ¶26, Ex. 16, p. 514, line 15 – p. 515, line 9].

policy but testified Debtor gave him papers. [Jasso Decl. ¶26, Ex. 16, p. 508, lines 7-19].

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52. Plaintiff subpoenaed the records from Old Republic Title that issued Debtor a preliminary title report on the 4476 Alderport condo on October 16, 2018. Debtor's Preliminary Title Report from Old Republic Title, which was given to Mr. Nickel, provides: a. The property located at 4476 Alderport was a condominium sublease held by the Debtor, Jamie L Gallian; b. Identified four parcels under the sublease that was recorded on the property which constituted the description of the condominium unit sublease, which is the same for all of the 80 condominiums other than specific 1-80 unit number and the 2003 First Amendment to the Sublease for Unit 53 [Jasso Decl. ¶29, Ex. 19, pp. 804-805 (parcels 1-4, which was almost identical to the recorded 2003 First Amendment for 4476 Alderport condo sublease), ¶35, Ex. 24, p.895]. The 4476 Alderport condo was properly identified as unit 53; c. Identified the recorded ground lease leased by the fee simple owner/lessor, Houser Bros Co., to the developer/lessee Robert Warmington, whose successor is BS Investors, who in turn subleases each unit to individuals who purchase the sublease; and d. Identified two unpaid, unreleased judgments of Debtor's recorded on the property. Debtor admitted at least one of these recorded judgments that attached to the property when Debtor became the owner in 2017 has never been released. Plaintiff obtained a certified copy of the TD Bank Abstract of Judgment, OC Record No. 2017-0096952, on November 11, 2022 which still shows an unreleased lien on Debtor's property, including the 4476 Alderport condo. [Jasso Decl. ¶29, Ex. 19, pp. 802-821, Old Republic Title Policy for 4476 Alderport condo unit 53 prepared for Debtor Jamie Gallian; Cert copy of TD Bank Recorded Abstract 2017-0096952; FAC DK 6, ¶ 42, Answer DK 13, ¶42.] 53. Debtor also admitted there was no escrow for the transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo sublease [Jasso Decl. ¶82, Ex. 71, p. 1534, lines 20-22, p. 1534, line 25 -- p. 1535, line 15, Gallian deposition 4-20-21]. Debtor further admitted that she gave Mr. Nickel her seller disclosures in a couple of black binders with all of the HOA information Debtor had. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 82, Ex. 71, p.

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1538, lines 14-19, p. 1539, lines 20-24 Gallian 4-20-21 Depo]. Unconcerned with the truth, Debtor testified under oath that her property was free and clear, when she knew the 4476 Alderport condo was in litigation, and she received her Old Republic Preliminary Title Report dated October 16, 2018 showing that Orange County records had property taxes lien and a TD Bank judgment lien, and she had received HOA lien information in the mail in August and September 2018 from the HOA attorneys and the landlord, BS Investors. [Jasso Decl. ¶82, Ex. 71, p. 1533, lines 20-21, Ex. Ex. 19, p. 805, para. 2, p.807, para. 10-11, Ex. 13, pp.456-477]. 54. Despite receiving information from the Debtor about the ongoing litigation and, specifically, the Plaintiff's and the other board members motion for attorney's fees scheduled on November 1, 2018, Mr. Nickel admitted there was no escrow and he did not obtain an escrow or real estate agent for the purchase of 4476 Alderport condo defaulted sublease. See Paragraph 47, supra; see also Paragraph 71, infra, regarding Mr. Nickel's subsequent admission that this transaction was against his better business sense. 55. On November 1, 2018, and notably after Debtor's two transfers of the 4476 Alderport condo to Mr. Nickel on October 30, 2018 and on October 31, 2018, Debtor appeared telephonically stating she had been in the hospital for the prior few days before the hearing for heart problems and said nothing about the sale of the condo. Debtor argued against the tentative ruling and asked for a court extension in order to sell the condo (prospectively) and settle with the HOA and the Board members, claiming she wanted to sell her condo. Debtor said: "I have to sell the house, and that is what I have been trying to do." [Jasso Decl. ¶¶7, 30, Ex. 20A, p.825, lines 17-18].

By making these statements on November 1, 2018, Debtor intentionally made the court and the attorney believe that she had not yet sold the condo, but was willing to do so, as evidence by the court referring to the court's prior hearing on July 19, 2018 in which the court ruled not to enforce the oral settlement put on the record: "When the settlement fell through, I, of course,

First Amended Complaint in the Enforcement Lawsuit. [Jasso Decl. ¶31, Ex. 20B, p. 835-837.].

58. On November 7, 2018, Mr. Nickel faxed a signed, notarized, and unrecorded transfer document created by Debtor between Defendant JP LLC and Mr. Nickel dated October 30, 2018 and copies of the front of two cashier's checks payable to Debtor totaling \$379,000. The checks did not include any identification of any property being purchased with the cashier's checks. The transfer document stated no consideration was paid and no transfer taxes were paid. [Jasso Decl. ¶32, Ex. 21, pp.838-846, Faxed Docs from Mr. Nickel on 11.7.18, after HOA attorney contacted him].

59. On November 1, 2018, Debtor emailed to the management company stating she sold the property and again without identifying Mr. Nickel, stated her buyer was impatient, tired of waiting regarding delays for escrow information purportedly sent to the management company by Ms. Shoats prior to meeting Mr. Nickel and made the decision himself to do the deal as a 'savvy investor'. Plaintiff believes Debtor and Mr. Nickel planted this false flag about a nonexistent escrow demand to make it appear as though the HOA had failed to act on her fabricated "escrow". [Jasso Decl.¶7, ¶ 25, Ex. 15, p. 485]

60. In December 2018, Plaintiff's attorney recorded an abstract of judgment for the attorney fees and costs awarded by the Court in November 2018, which Debtor never paid. *See* Paragraphs 33, *supra*.

61. Plaintiff went to the OC Tax Assessor's office and found that their records showed Debtor as the title owner of the 4476 Alderport condominium sublease. The Tax Assessor office confirmed that their records showed that Debtor paid the December 2018 property taxes owed on the 4476 Alderport condo sublease, which was listed as a lien on Debtor's October 16, 2018 Old Republic Preliminary Title Report. [Jasso Decl. ¶¶7, 29, Ex. 19, p. 805, para. 2].

62. In January 2019, the HOA motion for terminating sanctions in the Enforcement Lawsuit filed and served in November 2018 was granted. The court struck Debtor's answer due to Debtor's

ongoing refusal to comply with the state court's discovery orders and then entered default judgment for approximately \$319,000. [FAC DK 6 ¶55]. 63. On February 11, 2019, Debtor's financial declaration was reviewed and filed by the criminal court, which granted Debtor a state public defender. [Jasso Decl. ¶7, DK 49 and its Ex. C (OCSC Case No 18WM05278 criminal court minutes) at Exhibit Page 27, lines 3-4]. 64. From November 2018, the Plaintiff and the other HOA Board members continued to try to learn the facts regarding the purported ownership transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo asset, especially in light of the fact that Debtor claimed she was indigent to the criminal court after the transfer of the condo (Paragraph 43, above) and had not paid any of her judgment debts, outstanding HOA assessments, and HOA default judgment of over \$300,000 in attorneys fees, costs and damages. [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. 65. The HOA attorney, Pejman Kharrazian, and the Board President asked Mr. Nickel to meet with the Board in December 2018 and several times, thereafter, and asking Mr. Nickel to provide a copy of the Debtor-Nickel purchase agreement and trace the purported purchase funds. 66. On March 20, 2019, after months of the Board President trying to set up an informal mediation meeting, called an IDR, with Mr. Nickel and two board members, Lee Gragnano and Plaintiff, pursuant to Mr. Nickel's request that the HOA change the members books and add him as an owner "on his word", Plaintiff emailed Mr. Nickel requesting a copy of the purchase agreement and the name of the escrow agent, phone number and escrow number that he mentioned in his March 19, 2019 email. [Jasso Decl. ¶34, Ex. 23, p.880 (bottom)-881 (03.20.19 email between Jasso-Nickel)]. 67. On March 20, 2019, Mr. Nickel responded via email, admitting that there was no escrow company for the purchase, and that he only contacted an escrow company months after the transfer. Mr. Nickel admitted: "The Escrow company I used was ONLY to check that the Title to

my property at 4476 Alderport, HB, was in my name. This was a cash sale. Papers were signed

default judgment was dismissed by the state appellate court. [FAC DK 6, ¶56, Debtor's Answer DK ¶56, Jasso Decl. ¶33, Ex. 22, p. 868, Appellant's Open Brief Part V., first full paragraph]. 72. In May 2019, Mr. and Mrs. Nickel and her daughter, April Lovejoy, finally agreed to meet with Plaintiff and the Board President, as the HOA board representatives, in informal mediation, known as IDR, to explain to the Board what happened, discuss the issues related to his concealed transfer/purport claim of purchase and the next steps towards payment of the ongoing, outstanding special assessments on the 4476 Alderport condo under the governing documents for the judgments of the court. Plaintiff explained that the HOA had a fiduciary duty under the CC&Rs to collect the judgments, as special assessments against the condominium. Plaintiff explained to Mr. Nickel that the result would be the same for any condo owner who did what Mr. Nickel and Debtor did, including Board members. [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. 73. Mr. Nickel informed us that he knew everything about the HOA and the litigation before the purchase from Debtor, but he was still mad about the management company not calling him back or sending him his monthly bill. Plaintiff reminded Mr. Nickel that the HOA attorney, Pejman Kharazzian sent him a copy of the PI which applied to every person who associated with Debtor. Mr. Nickel confirmed that got the email, that he knew about the PI and admitted that during any litigation that he was involved with his legal counsel handled all communications. Mr. Nickel claimed, despite court orders, that he had the right to call up any homeowner's association's property management company anywhere, claim ownership and membership in any HOA. Mr. Nickel claimed the management company had the power to and must change the HOA books to reflect his ownership "on his word". I explained that no one has this right, including Board members. When I asked him if he would be okay if I did that regarding the 4476 Alderport condo, Mr. Nickel immediately agreed he would not have accepted my claim of ownership of the 4476 Alderport condo "on my word". [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. 74. I explained to Mr. Nickel about the stringent hoa Davis Stirling laws, including the Debtor's right to privacy regarding ongoing HOA litigation that can only be disclosed to a potential buyer

through a legal HOA escrow demand, and that, as board members, we comply with these rules by getting help from the HOA attorneys. Mr. Nickel agreed that he understood the same rules and knew all about HOA board member's duties because he had owned and lived in a California condominium in near Cal. State Fullerton for many years with his first wife. [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. 75. I shared with Mr. Nickel that my family purchased a condo in the HOA that was under litigation and that the seller and I only had to open escrow agent/company, I depositted a down payment with the escrow company and waited until the litigation was over before proceeding with the sale so that the escrow agent paid all litigation debts on the condo sublease, which included the HOA as one of the creditors, in order for the seller to transfer clean title to me and for me to receive a title policy. I explained the HOA could not communicate with me as a prospective buyer until after I signed escrow instructions and opened escrow with a licensed escrow agent due to a debtor's right to privacy and the potential for a tort claim being made by a debtor against the HOA for intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage under state law. Mr. Nickel responded immediately that he knew everything about escrows from his years of real estate transactions, explained several of his condo transactions in Long Beach, Fullerton and Big Bear, that he had real agents who handled all of it and that I did not need to explain anything to him. [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. 76. Mr. Nickel claimed he regretted doing the fast transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo sublease, and that the Debtor required him to do the under-the-table transfer the day before the motion for attorney's fees or they would lose the condo. [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. 77. Even with Mr. Nickel's decades of significant California condominium purchases/sales via escrow, Mr. Nickel chose to avoid a purchase agreement with escrow instructions, opening an escrow with an escrow company and engaging a real estate agent with the 4476 Alderport condo sublease. Mr. and Mrs. Nickel blamed the HOA and the board members for failing to help them

with some unknown, unstated issue. I asked what the HOA could do given the fact that they chose

1	to conceal themselves and their purported purchase when they knew the Debtor and the
2	condominium was in the Enforcement Lawsuit. Neither Mr. Nickel nor Mrs. Nickel answered my
3	question. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].
4	78. The Board minutes and HOA legal disclosure letters, provided to all buyers only via escrow,
5	for prospective buyers of condo subleases in the HOA regarding ongoing litigation with the 4476
$\begin{bmatrix} 6 \\ 7 \end{bmatrix}$	Alderport condo, which includes the four disclosure letters, the December 2018 Board minutes
8	and the August 2018 Board minutes with the approved lien information regarding the 4476
9	Alderport condo sublease in compliance with the governing documents and state HOA laws.
10	[Jasso Decl. ¶23 Ex. 13, pp. 456-477].
11	79. In October 2020, after multiple attempts to resolve the collection of the judgments with Mr.
12	Nickel failed, including ADR with the Hon. (ret.) Judge Thrasher who indicated this Debtor-
13	Nickel transfer was a CUVTA issue, Mr. Nickel sued the HOA to quiet title and remove the
14	HOA's and board member's judgment liens and assessment lien. The HOA cross-sued Debtor and
15	Mr. Nickel under California Uniform Voidable Transactions Act, Cal Civil Sec. 3439.04. [Jasso
16 17	Decl. ¶27; Ex 17]
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19	80. In his complaint, Mr. Nickel cited and attached the HOA's governing documents which
20	demonstrated Mr. Nickel's knowledge of the HOA's governing documents at the time he took the
21	4476 Alderport condo from Debtor, which are recorded on the property and the continuous lien on
22	every condo in the HOA, including the 4476 Alderport condo, under Section V, Section 5.1 of the
23	CC&Rs, which included all attorney's fees and expenses under CC&Rs Sections 5.4 and 14.7
24	related to bringing the unit into compliance with the CC&Rs since the Enforcement Lawsuit began
25	in April 2017. [Jasso Decl. ¶27, Ex. 17, pp. 631, 634, 644-645, 663, Nickel SAC ¶¶40, 48, 88,
26	154 (citing Section V. 5.1), his attached Exhibit A, p. 682 (Section 5.1 of the CC&Rs), p. 684
27	(Section 5.4 of the CC&Rs), and p. 708 (Section 14.7 of the CC&Rs)].

82. Mr. Nickel attached to his SAC the recorded Gallian-Nickel Assignment of the Ground lease and Sublease with his notarized signature dated October 31, 2018 as Exhibit F. This document shows that no transfer taxes were paid, and no consideration was paid for the 4476 Alderport condo defaulted sublease, which is Mr. Nickel's admission that he did not pay consideration for the transferred sublease and did not pay the transfer taxes. [Jasso Decl. ¶27, Ex. 17, p.738-742, Nickel SAC ¶ 35, Ex. F].

22 | 23 |

Nickel SAC ¶ 35, Ex. F].

83. The Gallian-Nickel transfer document is different from the escrow and title company's standard transfer document which escrow companies obtain from the landlord, BS Investors, pursuant to a sale of a condominium sublease via an escrow and title company that uses the Exhibit B of the 2003 First Amendment to the Condominium Sublease for unit. Comparing Mr. Nickel's transfer document to Exhibit B of the 2003 First Amendment to the Condominium Sublease for Unit 53 recorded by BS Investors and the condo sublessee pursuant to the settlement of the 2000 lawsuit, shows the stark difference between the parcels sublet under the 4476 Alderport condo unit 53's sublease, and the purported parcels Debtor granted in fee to Mr. Nickel including a conveyance of a remainder interest in the ground in fee that does not exist. [Jasso

the 4476 Alderport condo document dtd 10/31/18]. 84. Due to the fact that the Debtor and Mr. Nickel refused to produce bank records in the Nickel case, Plaintiff, in February 2022, under this Adversary Case, subpoenaed the bank statements from the Debtor's and Defendant LLC's banks. Debtor's personal Alliant Credit Union account and her personal Bank of America account were the only banks Plaintiff found for Debtor in October 2018. The Alliant Credit Union account had a balance of \$4791.00, and the Bank of America account had negative \$-3672.89, which combined showed her assets totaled \$1,118.11 on October 31, 2018, and was approximately -\$300,000 considering the discovery sanctions, the outstanding HOA assessments, and the HOA's litigation attorney's fees and costs and the Plaintiff and other Board members attorney's fees and costs. [Jasso Decl. ¶¶36,37, Ex. 25, p. 899 (top right corner of Alliant 10.31.18 Stmt) and 26 pp.904. (BofA 10.16.18 - 11.16.18 Stmt)]. 85. There have been several HOA condominium subleases in litigation before Mr. Nickel for failure to pay the HOA liens on the condominium sublease, including Plaintiff's. Every buyer was able to purchase a sublease via an escrow, communicate properly with the HOA, obtain clean title. A transparent non-fraudulent conveyance would have provided Mr. Nickel with the assurance that the HOA and the board members and their families financial solvency were not put at risk by a seller who the buyer knew was in ongoing litigation, knew that a motion for attorneys was scheduled the day after their October 31, 2018 transfer based on false claims against Plaintiff and the other board members, and further knew from the Debtor's own preliminary title report and the UD action by the landlord, BS Investors, that there was no fee simple ownership interest and that there were unpaid liens on the condominium sublease. (Jasso Decl. ¶ 7) All Mr. Nickel had to do was open escrow and wait for the ongoing litigation to be completed, and then the HOA could have communicated with him without any risk of more vexatious litigation by the Debtor. Debtor has a pattern of proper litigation against her targets in civil, probate, family and criminal cases. Mrs. Bradley, the HOA, Houser Bros, Debtor's neighbors, ex-husbands and

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HOA. Mr. Nickel had no rational reason to avoid escrow, to lie about a purchase agreement, to hid himself and the transfer and avoid communication with the HOA when he admittedly worked with real estate agents for decades buying and selling property in California through escrows. (Jasso Decl. ¶ 7)

Knowing that this tiny, financially strapped HOA and volunteer board members could not give the Debtor nor Mr. Nickel what they wanted, i.e. fee simple ownership of Huntington Beach property within 2 miles from Sunset Beach and a block from Humboldt Island, it begs the question: Why hurt this HOA, board members and all the HOA members? Why do an under-thetable transfer and then sue the HOA and volunteer board members who are handcuffed by numerous governing document rules, state statutes and state case law? The intentional harm to families by harming the HOA, which can only operate well if every sublessee voluntarily complies with the recorded rules, shows that the Debtor and Mr. Nickel coveted someone else's property rights, Houser Bros Co's fee simple ownership, so much that they recorded a fraudulent conveyance in a concealed transfer that is now in place with the OC Recorder's office, purportedly giving Mr. Nickel fee ownership of the common area. The logical benefit for Mr. Nickel would be a taking of property rights for purposes of a substantial, financial gain, because real townhomes in complexes next to the HOA are worth nearly \$1,000,000 right now and was \$600,000 at the time of the transfer. This real estate fraud scheme continues with the Debtor's attempt to take the land under the mobile home in fee simple, due to the substantial financial gain. California UVTA law was enacted and should be upheld to protect innocent creditors from people who do fraudulent conveyances to take something that does not belong to them. [FAC DK 6 ¶69, 84, Jasso Decl. ¶7, 15, Ex. 5, p. 385, paragraph A].

# 2. <u>Facts Related to Debtor Transferring and Concealing Funds for Personal Use</u> <u>in the Defendant JSC LLC and Defendant JP LLC to Prevent Collection of</u> <u>Debtor's assets by Plaintiff</u>

86. On March 22, 2022, Debtor admitted in her corporate ownership statement that the Defendant LLCs were created on October 18, 2018 and have been single-member wholly owned California limited liability companies which she terminated on November 22, 2021. [See DK 29].

- 1 86. On July 9, 2021, Debtor admitted that Defendant JSC LLC was wholly owned by the Debtor
- 2 | since its inception, October 18, 2018. [FAC DK 6 ¶44, Debtor Answer DK 13 ¶44, Jasso Decl.
- 3 | ¶11, Ex. 1, p. 52, Original Petition Dk 1, Schedule A/B, Item 19].
- 4 | 87. On July 9, 2021, Debtor originally scheduled her interest in Defendant JP LLC as 33%. [Jasso
- 5 Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, p.52, Original Petition DK 1, Schedule A/B, Item 19].
- $6 \parallel 88$ . Debtor also stated in her 341a hearings that she owned one-third (1/3<sup>rd</sup>) of the Defendant JP
- 7 | LLC, and then stated she owned one-seventh  $(1/7^{th})$  and then stated she owned seventy percent
- 8 | (70%). [FAC DK 66]. She also changed the percentage ownership on her Schedule A/B, Item 19
- 9 without any reason for the change. [Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, p.53, Original Petition DK 1, Schedule
- 10 | A/B, Item 19, p. 72, DK 16, September 22, 2021, Schedule A/B Item 19, and p.83, DK 22,
- 11 || October 14, 2021 DK 22, Schedule A/B Item 19].
- 12 | 89. However, by filing Debtor's Corporate Ownership Statement Pursuant to FRBP 1007(a)(1)
- 13 | and 7007.1, and LBR 1007-4, DK 29, Debtor admits that she made false oaths in her 341a hearing
- 14 | and on her bankruptcy petition, because Defendant JP LLC has been her single-member, wholly-
- owned California limited liability company since October 18, 2018. [DK 29].
- 16 | 90. In her Corporate Ownership Statement, Debtor's admitted that the single member Defendant
- 17 | LLCs entities never operated a business, by stating the Defendant LLCs "never conceptually
- 18 | operated as anticipated". [DK 29].
- 19 | 91. Debtor further admitted that she as the single member of the Defendant LLCs filed certificates
- 20 | of cancellation for both of them on November 22, 2021. [DK 29].
- 21 | 92. Defendant answered the Plaintiff's FAC on behalf of each of the Defendant LLCs as the sole
- 22 | member in pro per. [DKs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 55-56].
- 23 | 93. Debtor operated Defendant JP LLC and Defendant JSC LLC as her alter-egos since October
- 24 | 18, 2018 in order to shield herself from personal liability while at the same time using funds of
- 25 | these businesses for personal purposes. [FAC DK 6 ¶91].
- a. <u>Facts Related to Debtor's Transfer of Personal Funds from Her</u>
- 27 Concealed Transfer of the 4476 Alderport Condo to Mr. Nickel Starting on

1	October 31, 2018 through July 9, 2021, the Date of Debtor's Bankruptcy
2	<u>Petition</u>
3	94. The HOA's debtor's examination in the Enforcement Lawsuit was requested in December
4	2020, which was issued by the civil court on March 4, 2021 and was scheduled for June 3, 2021.
5	The examination included the request for Debtor to produce all documents related to the 4476
6	Alderport condo transfer, all other personal financial information, and all corporate and bank
7	records related to the Defendant LLCs. [Jasso Decl. ¶38, Ex. 27, p.910-912].
8	95. Debtor admitted that on or about July 8, 2021, Debtor refused to comply with the court-ordered
9	debtor's examination in civil Court and the attached request for production of documents related to
10	the Debtor's financial condition. A warrant was issued for her arrest and the Debtor immediately
11	filed for this Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. [FAC DK 6 ¶65, Debtor Answer DK 13 ¶65].
12	96. Immediately prior to filing for bankruptcy, Debtor's public appellate attorney first filed the
13	Debtor's appellant's opening brief on June 18, 2021 in her appeal of the two convictions of her
14	crimes, OCSC Case No. 30-19-01119765, and second filed Debtor's appellant's opening brief on
15	July 1, 2021 in her appeal of the court's victim restitution order, OCSC Case No. 30-21-01189657.
16	[Jasso Decl. ¶ 39, Ex. 28, p. 917, ROA #84, and p. 919, ROA #15 (ROAs from these two criminal
17	appellate cases with legal counsel provided by the State of California)].
18	97. Also immediately prior to Debtor filing for bankruptcy, on May 26, 2021, the criminal court
19	issued an abstract of judgment against the Debtor for the criminal restitution debt, which Plaintiff
20	recorded at the OC Recorder's office. See Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice, DK 49 and its Ex
21	E. In addition, on May 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a UCC lien for the criminal restitution abstract of
22	judgment ordered under criminal Case No. 18WM05278. [FAC DK 6 ¶64].
23	98. In February 2022, per my discovery plan filed with the court in January 2022 in this case,
24	Plaintiff subpoenaed the bank records of Defendant JSC LLC from JP Morgan Chase Bank, Aliant
25	Credit Union, Wells Fargo Bank, Bank of America, the U.S. Government's Pension Benefit
26	Guaranty Corporation and Fidelity Investments starting January 1, 2018 along with real estate
27	records from the Dept. of Housing and Community Development, Old Republic Title Company

1	and the Orange County recorder's office regarding property related to the Debtor and any of her
2	related entities or insiders. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 7].
3	99. Plaintiff also subpoenaed the bank records of Defendant LLCs from JP Morgan Chase Bank,
4	Alliant Credit Union, Wells Fargo Bank, Bank of America and Fidelity Investments starting
5	January 1, 2018. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].
6	100. On June 29, 2019, the HOA's bank levy writ was issued for Debtor's Bank of America
7	assets, and on February 27, 2020, the OC Sheriff returned the writ stating there were no assets. To
8	date, Plaintiff cannot find any payment of the \$3672.89 funds Debtor owed to Bank of America in
9	October 2018, which is therefore still outstanding, and which do not appear to be listed by the
10	Debtor on her bankruptcy schedules. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 40, Ex. 29, p.922-923 (bank levy)].
11	101. Well Fargo Bank subpoena records stated that Randall Nickel cashier's check dated October
12	30, 2018 in the amount of \$140,000 payable to Defendant JP LLC was used to purchase Randall
13	Nickel cashier's check dated October 31, 2018 payable to Debtor Jamie Lynn Gallian. [Jasso
14	Decl. ¶ 41, Ex. 30, pp. 925 (WFB subpoena response declaration)].
15 16	102. On October 31, 2018, JP Morgan Chase bank subpoenaed records showing Debtor opened
17	two personal accounts, a savings account ending in #7891 and a checking account ending in
18	#0186, but immediately withdrew all of the funds as provided in more detail below. [Jasso Decl.
19	¶42, Ex. 31, p.927-928, a true and correct copy of the Chase Private Client Savings ("Chase PCS
20	#7981") signature cards for the savings account ending in #7891 and the Chase Private Client
21	Checking ("Chase PCC #0186") account ending in #0186 and monthly bank statements.].
22	b. Paragraphs 103-107 relate to Debtor's movement of \$366,600, leaving
23	\$100 in the Debtor's Personal Chase PCS #7891 on November 3, 2018.
24	103. On October 31, 2018, Debtor deposited \$366,600 cash in the Chase PCS #7981. The
25	remainder \$12,400 cash was untraceable. [Jasso Decl. ¶42, Ex. 31, p.931, a true and correct copy
26	)

of Chase PCS bank account statement October 31, 2018 through November 30, 2018].

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deposits between November 16, 2018 through May 13, 2019, for a total of \$110,000. Debtor held

the other four checks and deposited one into her Alliant Credit Union ID 41 personal account, one

into her personal Chase #5315 account, and two redeposited into this Chase PCC #0186 account, between November 2018 through April 2019. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 43, Ex. 32, p. 946]. 112. On November 6, 2018, Debtor paid her November rent to Sumac Apartment LLC for her home on 5782 Pinon Dr. in Huntington Beach in the amount of \$3400.00. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 42, Ex. 31, p. 939] 113. On November 7, 2018, Debtor withdrew \$175,000 in one cashier's check, Serial Number 1085245498, payable to Defendant JSC LLC. [Jasso Decl. ¶42, Ex. 31, pp. 939, 943]. 114. On November 8, 2018, Debtor withdrew \$1,600 to open/deposit into her personal Chase Total Checking account ending in #5315. Debtor then immediately transferred \$500 from this account to Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 42, Ex. 31, p.939, 951]. 115. On November 8, 2018, Debtor withdrew \$20,000 in two cashier's checks which Plaintiff could not locate and presumed still in Debtor's possession. This left a \$0 balance in Debtor's personal Chase PCC #1086. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 42, Ex. 31, pp. 939, 944]. d. Paragraphs 116-163 relate to Debtor's movement of \$355,000 funds <u>Debtor into Debtor's Alter Ego, Defendant JSC LLC's Chase #7860</u> account, to Purchase a Mobile Home in a Concealed Transfer, Enabling Debtor to Conceal Funds to Lisa Ryan, then Conceal Funds to and from Fidelity and the Transfer Concealed Funds to Defendant JP LLC, leaving \$368.46 on July 9, 2021, the date of Debtor's Bankruptcy Petition. 116. Debtor never provided Trustee any escrow, purchase agreement or title report related the acquisition of the mobile home from Lisa Ryan to Debtor on November 1, 2018 nor Lisa Ryan to Defendant JSC LLC on November 16, 2018. No corporate records were provided. Debtor never qualified and obtained a legal lease from the mobile home park owners prior to the purchase, as required by the park's requirements. [See DK 101 of Original Bk 8:21-bk-11710-SC and its Ex. S,

November 16, 2018, enabled Debtor to wash and then transfer away to Lisa Ryan \$150,000 of the

Bates Page 278, Paragraphs 5-6]. Therefore, Lisa Ryan's concealed transfer of the mobile home

to Defendant JSC LLC by signing over the title of the mobile home to Defendant JSC LLC on

Three of the check's amounts were each \$50,000, for a total of \$150,000. The fourth check amount was \$20,000. Debtor provided Trustee and the creditors copies of the front of these four checks after her August 18, 2021 341a hearing. On October 14, 2021, Debtor's second 341a

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hearing was held. Debtor testified under oath that she personally paid these four checks to Lisa Ryan totaling \$170,000 plus \$10,000 cash in November 2018. [Jasso Decl. ¶46, Ex. 35, p. 988, see p. 9 lines 1-5 of the October 14, 2021 transcript of 341a hearing].

Plaintiff subpoenaed JP Morgan Chase Bank to trace the four checks. The three \$50,000 cashier's checks were endorsed by Lisa Ryan and deposited into a Bank of America account on November 17, 2018. The fourth \$20,000 was endorsed by Debtor and deposited by her into Debtor's personal Chase PCC #0186 account on December 31, 2018. [Jasso Decl. ¶47, Ex. 36, pp.1005-1010]. Chart with attached Defendant JSC LLC's four November 16, 2018 170k cashier's checks payable to Lisa Ryan].

See also Paragraph 110, *supra*, for Debtor's December 31, 2018 deposit of Lisa Ryan's \$20,000 cashier's check into Debtor's personal Chase PCC #0186, from which she then transferred back \$18,000 to this account.

- 121. The November 8, 2018 single \$5,000 cashier's check drawn by Gallian from Defendant JSC
- LLC Chase Acct #7860, cited in Paragraph 116, *supra*, was payable to Gallian and cashed by
- Gallian on November 13, 2018. Therefore, that cash could not be traced. [Jasso Decl. ¶48, Ex. 37,
- p. 1012, a true and correct copy of the traced and cashed Cashier's Check # 1085245528 from
- 122. The November 16, 2018, single \$10,000 last (or 17<sup>th</sup>) cashier's check, Serial #1085235519,
- from Paragraph 119, supra, was cashed by Gallian on November 26, 2018 and the cash could not
- be traced. [Jasso Decl. ¶49, Ex. 38, p. 1014, a true and correct copy of the traced and cashed
- Cashier's Check #1085245519 from Chase Bank].
- 123. On November 17, 2018 (shown on 11/19/18 in the bank statement), the Debtor deposited one
- 23 of her November 3, 2018 personal cashier's checks in the amount of \$10,000, as described in
- 24 Paragraph 111 supra, with attached Ex. 32 Chart, into Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860 account.
- 25 [Jasso Decl. ¶ 44, Ex. 33, pp. 951, 978-979, Nov. bank statement a true and correct copy of the 26
- traced and deposited Debtor Cashier's Check #1085245413 into Defendant JSC LLC]. 27

130. On May 3, 2019, Defendant JSC LLC paid Debtor's personal attorney, Mr. James Casello,

\$10,000 with a JSC LLC check. Mr. Casello represented Debtor in Plaintiff's personal restraining order case, *Jasso v. Gallian*, OCSC Case No. 30-2018-00986785. [Jasso Decl. ¶54, Ex. 43, pp.1040, 1044].

131. On May 13, 2019, Debtor deposited \$88,743.07 in cashier's checks. \$80,000 came from eight (8) Chase PCC #0186 November 3, 2018 cashier's checks as detailed in the chart referenced

eight (8) Chase PCC #0186 November 3, 2018 cashier's checks as detailed in the chart referenced in Paragraph 124, *supra*. This also included one cashier's check in the amount of \$8743.07 payable to RDR Mobile Home Estates as detailed in Paragraph 124, *supra*. This brought the Defendant JSC LLC account balance to \$107,289.60 on May 13, 2019. [Jasso Decl. ¶54, Ex. 43, pp.1040, 1043-1054].

132. On May 13, 2019, Debtor wired \$96,000 to Debtor's personal Fidelity IRA rollover account, #169-638064. [Jasso Decl. ¶54, Ex. 43, p. 1041,1055 and ¶55, Ex. 44, pp. 1058-1090 (Fidelity IRA statements).

133. On May 13, 2019, Debtor used her Defendant JSC LLC to purchase personal items such as groceries at Albertsons. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 54, Ex. 43, p. 1041].

134. On May 3, 2019 and May 23, 2019, Debtor used her Defendant JSC LLC Atm card to withdrawal \$300 and \$1000 in cash, respectively. [Jasso Decl. ¶54, Ex. 43, p.1040-1041].

135. Immediately after moving the funds into her personal Fidelity IRA rollover account, Debtor

increased her stalking and threatening me and my family. Specifically:

On June 10, 2019, in the Criminal Case No. 18WM05278. Judge Carillo ordered Debtor to stay 100 yards away from my home, my daughter and I as a condition of release. The Court warned Debtor to follow the court orders, or she may be incarcerated. Debtor continued to violate the stay away order stalking and threatening us. [Jasso Decl. ¶7, DK 21, Bates Page 29]. On June 21, 2019, HBPD PR#19-008061, Debtor was very angry and tried to run me over with her car while I was on foot inside the HOA, violating the 100 yards criminal stay away order.

[Jasso Decl. ¶7. DK 21, Bates Page 29].

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On July 15, 2019, HBPD PR #19-009415, Ms. Gallian sat in her vehicle within 50 yards of my home, staring at me for several minutes, her face looked very angry, all within moments of me walking out my front door to leave my home in the HOA. [Jasso Decl. ¶7, DK 21, Bates Page 29].

On July 25, 2019, HBPD PR #19-009993. Ms. Gallian tried to run me over with her car while I was on my bike inside the HOA. Ms. Gallian swore "Fuck You" at me, violating the no contact and 100 yards stay away order. Police warned Ms. Gallian to follow the court orders. [Jasso Decl. ¶7, DK 21, Bates Page 29].

On August 7, 2019, the criminal court found Debtor had violated the conditions of her release, arrested her, and issued a criminal protective order, 100 yard stay order, and no contact order for me, my daughter and my home in the HOA. The court ordered bail in the amount of \$50,000. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 7, see also DK 49 and its Ex. C (Criminal court minutes) p. 35, lines 3-6]. 136. On June 11, 2019, Debtor electronically transferred \$300 cash and \$1000 cash to her personal Chase PCC #0186 account, which she then withdrew from her Chase PCC #0186 account. This left \$97.03 in this account on June 30, 2019. In July 2019, the bank withdrew its \$15 service fee bringing the balance to \$82.03. [Jasso Decl. ¶56, Ex. 45 p. 1092, and ¶57, Ex. 46 p. 1095]. 137. On August 16, 2019, after the criminal court hearing which included an appoint of another public defender, Debtor wired \$89,000 into this account from Debtor's personal Fidelity IRA account. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 58, Ex. 47, p. 1098, see Paragraphs 131-132, supra, to trace the funds]. 138. On August 16, 2019, Debtor withdrew \$74,999 cashier's check payable to Defendant JP LLC, which Debtor deposited into Defendant JP LLC's Bank of America account ending in #1274 ("BofA #1274"). [Jasso Decl. ¶ 58, Ex. 47 p. 1099, 1103].

139. On August 16, 2019, Debtor withdrew \$7,000 cashier's check payable to Michael Devereux

Esq. In September 2019, Michael Devereux Esq., who was her personal attorney in the HOA's

payment and United Airlines insurance. [Jasso Decl. ¶7, ¶ 65, Ex. 54 pp. 1162-1163].

Debtor used Defendant JSC LLC to pay her personal criminal bail in the amount of \$2500 with a

1	check, along with paying personal bills totaling \$1401.70 for her cell phone, car payment, Capital
2	One credit card and Home Depot credit card, for a total of \$3,901.70 as electronic payments.
3	[Jasso Decl. ¶70, Ex. 59 pp 1202-1204, 1207].
4	159. From February 2021 through July 9, 2021, Debtor used \$2925.22 to pay her car payment, cell
5	phone, and credit cards as electronic payments. [Jasso Decl. ¶71, Ex. 60 pp. 1210, 1215, 1217,
6	1219, 1221].
8	160. On July 8, 2021, based on my calculation, there was \$9376.46. [Jasso Decl. ¶71, Ex. 60
9	pp.1224-1226].
10	161. On July 9, 2021, knowing that the remaining funds in this account were the distributed 401k
11	plan funds turn personal bankruptcy assets, Debtor withdrew \$9000 in one cashier's check with
12	Defendant JSC LLC as the name Remitter and payable to her ex-husband Ronald Pierpont plus a
13	bank fee of \$8 for the cashier's check. This left a balance in the Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860
14	account on July 9, 2019 of \$368.46. [Jasso Decl. ¶71, Ex. 60, p.1225].
15   16	162. On August 4, 2021, Debtor endorsed the back of the check and redeposited it into the
17	Defendant JSC LLC bank account. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 71, Ex. 60 pp.1233, 1239-1240].
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19	163. On August 4, 2021, Debtor then withdrew \$7000 in one cashier's check payable to the man
20	Debtor has lived with for many years, Robert McLelland, thereby continuing Debtor's pattern of
21	hiding her personal assets of cash in and out of Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860 account with
22	multiple cashier's checks. [Jasso Decl. ¶71, Ex. 60, pp. 1233, 1241].
23	e. <u>Paragraphs 164-175 relate to Debtor's movement of \$75,000 funds</u>
24	Debtor received originally from Mr. Nickel on October 31, 2018, moved
25	into personal Chase #0186 cashier's checks, then deposited into into
26	Debtor's Alter Ego, Defendant JSC LLC, then transferred to Debtor's
27	personal Fidelity IRA, then transferred back to Defendant JSC LLC, then

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Decl. ¶75, Ex. 64, pp. 1260-1261].

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168. On September 3, 2019, Debtor deposited \$1000. On September 26, 2019, Debtor deposited \$7,500. Both checks were monies from prior attorneys that refunds these funds to Debtor. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 74, Ex. 63 p. 1253].

169. From September 3, 2019-September 30, 2019, Debtor withdrew cash, paid for her groceries, restaurants and other personal items totaling \$1684.50. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 74, Ex. 63 p.1253].

170. On September 29, 2019, Debtor electronically transferred \$2894.93 to her personal Alliant

Credit Union Account, which then Debtor used to pay her personal Alliant Visa. The Alliant Visa shows a total payment of \$4894.93, which was made up of the \$3894.93 plus \$2,000 cash possibly from the cash funds in Paragraph 166, *supra*. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 71, Ex. 63, pp. 1253, 1255-1256]. 171. In November 2019, Debtor spent \$2682.37, which included withdrawals of cash, purchases of Jack In the Box, Subway and other restaurants, pet food, CVS pharmacy and hair salon. [Jasso

172. In December 2019, Debtor spent \$9849.46, which included \$5,000 to Steven Gallian,

Debtor's son, cash withdrawals, and purchases of groceries, restaurants, and sporting goods. [Jasso Decl. ¶76, Ex. 65 pp.1269-1270].

173. In January 2020, Debtor had violated the restraining orders protecting Plaintiff and my family and was arrested. Debtor used this Defendant JP LLC BofA #1274 to pay bail. On January 28, 2020, Debtor paid bail with one JP LLC cashier's check in the amount of \$7500 and another in the amount of \$5,000. In addition, Debtor paid her personal items including Capital one credit card, restaurants, cable tv bill, hair salon, Macy's, withdrew cash totaling \$2745.19. [Jasso Decl. ¶77, Ex. 66, pp. 1278-1279, 1282, 1286].

174. On March 4, 2021, Debtor's JP LLC #1274 account balance was \$ 4493.70, and on July 1, 2021, Debtor's had dwindled the Defendant JP LLC BofA #1274 to a balance of \$2454.20, by using \$3390.77 on personal expenses such as Capital One, Kohls, Staples, restaurants, personal

180. At the time of Debtor's transfer of her personal funds from Mr. Nickel to Debtor's Defendant

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JSC LLC Chase #7860 account and then to Debtor's personal Fidelity IRA rollover account, Debtor knew that this Fidelity account only had \$75.89. Therefore, Debtor could have only scheduled \$75.89 on Item 21 of Schedule A/B. [Jasso Decl. ¶ 7]. 181. From November 16, 2018 to May 13, 2019, ten (10) of the fifteen (15) November 3, 2018 cashier's checks totaling \$100,000 as detailed on Chart 32, from Debtor's personal Chase PCC #0186 account related to Mr. Nickel's \$379,000 cashier's checks, were deposited into Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860 account. By holding cashier's checks in Defendant JSC LLC, Debtor avoided paying her judgment debts and claimed she was indigent in criminal court in January 2019 to obtain an appointed public defender and another public defender in August 2019. Debtor then wired \$96,000 to this Fidelity account. Debtor knew that the funds she wired into her personally Fidelity IRA account in May 2019 were not qualified retirement plan rollover money or wages, but instead was money from Mr. Nickel on October 31, 2018. When Debtor transfer back \$89,373.62 to Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860 account in August 2019, the remaining funds in the Fidelity IRA account were not qualified retirement plan money. Debtor repeated the lie that this money was qualified retirement plan monies on multiple amended bankruptcy Schedules A/B, Item 21. [See Paragraph 179, supra, see also Jasso Decl. ¶43, Ex. 32, ¶53-55, Exs. 42-44, see also, Paragraphs 110, 131, 132, *supra*].

g. <u>Paragraphs 182-199 relate to Debtor's statements regarding Debtor's</u>

<u>Defendant JP LLC's January 2019 'perfected lien' on the mobile home</u>

<u>based on a \$225,000 financing loan from Debtor's alter ego JSC LLC to</u>

<u>Debtor and making Debtor's alter ego Defendant JP LLC the lienholder on</u>

<u>the mobile home which helps Debtor hinder creditors collecting an asset.</u>

1 in the UVTA case: Nickel v. The Huntington Beach Gables HOA, et al., Case No. 30-20-. Debtor 2 clearly answered on this date that Defendant JSC LLC owned the mobile home, as follows: 3 "Q: Jay Castle Co, LLC, what is the nature of that company? 4 A: That's an LLC that I applied for. 5 Q: And when did you apply for that? 6 A: October 18th, 2018. 7 Q: Okay. Is there any assets in that company? 8 9 A: Yes. 10 Q: And what assets are in that company? 11 A: The personal property located at 16222 Monterey Lane, No. 376, APN 89165962." 12 [Jasso Decl. ¶ 82, Ex. 71, p.1496, lines 3-13] 13 189. Mr. Feldsott also asked Debtor about Defendant JP LLC, her ownership interest and what 14 business JP LLC does. Debtor never identified any lien holder interest in the mobile home. 15 Unwilling to tell the truth about her 100% ownership, prior to filing for bankruptcy protection, 16 17 Debtor only identified a unstarted, inoperative business in Defendant JSC LLC's mobile home as 18 follows: 19 "Q: What about Jay Pad? Is that one of your companies? 20 A: It's not mine solely. There's several owners. 21 Q: And what percentage do you own of Jay Pad? 22 A: Probably my portion now is 35 percent. Maybe a little bit less. 23 24 Q: What's the business of Jay Pad? 25 A: Several things. They have products. They distribute products. They're in cleaning. Let's see.

Q: So those would be the products they supply?

What else? They're, like, cleaning supplies for car detailing.

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was issued for her arrest. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].

192. Based on the cashier's checks purchased by Debtor through the Defendant JP LLC BofA

violations of the governing documents and that she was entitled to indemnification from Plaintiff and the other board members, which was all a lie. [Jasso Decl. 7].

203. Then, Debtor moved \$355,000 into Defendant JSC LLC Chase bank account to purchase the mobile home from Lisa with \$150,000 in cashier's checks, created a loan from Debtor to Defendant JSC LLC in the amount of \$225,000 secured by the mobile home in favor of Defendant JP LLC, which helped Debtor tie up the mobile home asset with a lien held her alter-ego, Defendant JP LLC, and recorded via a UCC lien on the mobile home asset in favor of Debtor. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].

204. Then, Debtor used the funds in Defendant JSC LLC to pay personal expenses and to wash approximately \$96,000 through Debtor's Fidelity IRS investment account and back to Defendant JSC LLC Chase Bank account and then transfer to Defendant JP LLC's BofA account in order for the Debtor to fabricate a story that she was living off of her retirement funds. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].

more vexatious litigation against her new target, Houser Bros Co., for the ground underneath the mobile home in fee simple, which Debtor admitted would gain her a property in fee simple worth over \$800,000 due to its proximity to Sunset Beach and Humbolt Island, while living rent free or utilities free since November 2018. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Plaintiff respectfully requests the court make the above findings of fact from which the court may order an equitable solution by entering default judgment against the Defendant LLCs, by specifically added them to Plaintiff's judgments as Debtor's alter-egos as provided in *Curci*. This equitable solution is a just result as Plaintiff's judgment is nondischargeable under 523(a)(2)(A), and discharge should be denied under 727(a)(3), 727(a)(4), as provided below, due to Debtor using her alter-ego Defendant LLCs to prevent the collection of assets that were

available to pay the Debtor debts prior to her bankruptcy petition and are available for the Trustee to collect to pay creditors. [Jasso Decl. ¶7].

#### IV. ARGUMENT FOR EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS UNDER DEFAULT JUDGMENT

## A. Outside Reverse Veil Piercing is Appropriate Here Because Defendant LLCs are Debtor's Alter-Egos

Outside reverse veil piercing differs from traditional veil piercing, which is permitted pursuant to the well-known alter ego doctrine. "'The alter ego doctrine prevents individuals or other corporations from misusing the corporate laws by the device of a sham corporate entity ....'"

(Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 214, 221, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 847

("Curci").) In appropriate circumstances, traditional veil piercing permits a party to pierce the corporate or limited liability company (LLC) veil "so that an individual shareholder [or LLC member] may be held personally liable for claims against the corporation [or LLC]." (Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1513, 77 Cal.Rptr.3d 96.)

"Rather than seeking to hold an individual responsible for the acts of an entity, reverse veil piercing seeks to satisfy the debt of an individual through the assets of an entity of which the individual is an insider." (Curci, supra, at p. 221, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 847.) "Outside reverse veil piercing arises when the request for piercing comes from a third party outside the targeted business entity." (Ibid.)

California Civil Code Section 187 authorizes a trial court to amend a judgment to add a judgment debtor who is found to be an alter ego of a corporation defendant. *Misik v. D'Arco* (2011) 197 Cal.App. 4<sup>th</sup> 1065, 1069, 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 123. The alter-ego doctrine was extended to LLCs by California Corporations Code section 17703.04, subsection (b), which states "A member of a limited liability company shall be subject to liability under the common law governing alter ego liability." California courts have held that this provision allows a creditor to add a nonparty alter-ego as a judgment debtor. "This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court

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Cal.Rptr.3d 469.

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the real defendant." *Leek v. Cooper* (2011)194 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 399, 419, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 56.

In applying the alter-ego doctrine, no particular findings are necessary, but the conditions under which a corporate entity should be ignored vary according to the circumstances of each

is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of

case. Butler America LLC v. Aviation Assurance Co., LLC (2020) 55 Cal. App.5<sup>th</sup> 136, 146, citing Toho-Towa Co., LTD v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4<sup>th</sup> 1096, 1108, 159

In one recent case, *In Re Brugnara Properties VI*, (*Brugnara Properties VI v. IRS*), 606 B.R. 371 (N.D. California 2019), at p. 380, the bankruptcy court in the Northern District of California cited several factors involved in determining unity of interest, including:

- Commingling of funds and other assets;
- The treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as his own;
- The failure to maintain adequate corporate records;
- Sole ownership of all of the stock in a corporation by one individual or the family members;
- The use of the same office or business location;
- The use of the corporation as a mere shell for the business of an individual;
- The disregard of legal formalities and the failure to maintain arm's length relationships among the related entities;
- The diversion of assets from a corporation by or to a stockholder or other person or entity, to the detriment of creditors.

## 1. <u>Unity of interest and ownership such that the separate personalities of Debtor, JP</u> <u>LLC and JSC LLC do not exist.</u>

Since October 18, 2018, Defendant LLCs were single member California limited liability companies 100% owned by the Debtor [Debtor's Corporate Ownership Statement Pursuant to FRBP 1007(a)(1) and 7007.1, and LBR 1007-4, DK 29]. This corporate form was filed by Debtor

under penalty of perjury on March 16, 2022 in this case. The form was required as of the date of the answers of the Defendant LLCs.

Debtor used her April 20, 2021 deposition and her 341a hearings to create red herrings and confusion about her ownership interest in Defendant JP LLC. For example, in response to being asked who the members of Defendant JP LLC were, Debtor said "I don't have permission to disclose that". She was the only member, so how come she could not disclose that? [Jasso Decl. ¶7, Paragraph 189, supra, and Jasso Decl. ¶82, Ex. 71, p. 1497, lines 16-19]

In her 341a hearing, Debtor played games by answering that the ownership of Defendant JP LLC is "depending on who you ask today". [Jasso Decl. ¶83, Ex. 72, p. 1542, p. 14, lines 3-8 of the 341a Hearing 08.18.21]. Debtor scheduled that she had a 33% interest in JP LLC, then 1/7th interest in JP LLC, then 70% interest in JP LLC, via four different schedules, before Plaintiff filed the FAC. Plaintiff included Debtor's testimony under oath of her changing story of the JP LLC ownership in the FAC because there was no accounting for the change, and nothing given to Debtor in exchange for Debtor's sales or purchases of her ownership JP LLC interest even though she had been asked to provide it. She could have simply stated she was always the 100% owner like she did on her Corporate Ownership Form.

Starting November 22, 2021, Debtor started listing her ownership interest in Defendant JP LLC as 100%, and finally filed a Corporate Ownership Statement on March 16, 2022. [Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, p. 113, Item 19, DK 29]. This bankruptcy form filed under Dk 29 should be used as the conclusive proof of Debtor's 100% ownership of both Defendant LLCS since October 18, 2018. [Jasso Decl. ¶7, *see also* Paragraphs 39-40, *supra*].

In addition, Debtor is the managing member of the Defendant LLCs, as listed on the Defendant LLCs bank signature cards, and her corporate ownership statement [Jasso Decl. ¶44, Ex. 33, p.948 and ¶73, Ex. 62, p. 1245, and DK 29].

Decl. ¶7].

There was no observance of corporate formalities. There is no corporate documentation for the transfer of funds to or from the Defendant LLCs to Debtor, or to or from Debtor's Fidelity IRA, or to Lisa Ryan or the payment of Debtor's personal expenses enumerated in the Paragraphs 116-163, supra, and the exhibits incorporated herein by reference, Jasso Decl. ¶7. Therefore, there is a unity of interest and ownership between Debtor and each JSC LLC and JP LLC. Specifically, Plaintiff showed that the Defendant LLCs (1) since October 2018, were solely owned by the Debtor [Debtor's Corporate DK 29] despite lies she made in the 341a hearing, (2) had no legitimate business activity [Debtor's Corporate DK 29], (3) the Defendant LLCs had no third-party creditors prior to the bankruptcy as the only purported lien was an insider lien on the Defendant JSC LLC's mobile home by Defendant JP LLC and the Debtor's ex-husband Ron Pierport which was released on July 9, 2021, (4) had no observance of corporate formalities, (5) the address of the Defendant LLCs is the same as the sole owner, the Debtor, (6) the Debtor misrepresented that there were changing ownership interests of Defendant JP LLC (7) Debtor used these sham corporations to hide Debtor's \$355,000 in cash obtained from Mr. Nickel starting on November 7, 2018, and (6) since October 2018, the Debtor, as the sole owner/member of the Defendant LLCs, had total control over her assets and used the Defendant LLCs to transfer her assets in her sham corporations by fraudulently moving money in and out of the Defendant LLCs bank accounts and Debtor's personal Fidelity IRA account up through the date of her bankruptcy petition via cash withdrawals and cashier's checks, while also using the money in the Defendant LLCs for her personal expenses, including criminal bail, personal credit card debt, car payments, cell phone bills, groceries, ATM cash withdrawals, to pay Lisa Ryan \$150,000 in JSC LLC cashier's checks in a concealed transfer of the JSC LLC mobile home, and washed money from JSC LLC through her Fidelity IRA to claim a bankruptcy exemption of what is actually nonqualified retirement IRA money. Debtor planned that by Defendant JSC LLC continuously receiving loaned funds from Debtor, the lien on JSC LLC in favor of JP LLC, which kept

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Ex. 1, pp. 53, 97 (Schedule A/B, Item 19)].

increasing to a total of \$263,000, to prevent collection of the mobile home asset. [Jasso Decl. ¶11,

Therefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court order an equitable solution under the California *Curci* doctrine that Defendant J-Pad, LLC and Defendant J-Sandcastle Co LLC are the alter-egos of Debtor. This equitable result may help the Trustee to obtain trust assets for distribution to creditors, including Plaintiff. But also, as Debtor has a pattern of hiding assets for years, Plaintiff believes this will continue with post-bankruptcy assets, and therefore, Plaintiff also respectfully requests and order that these Defendant LLCs are both added as judgment debtors to Plaintiff's criminal restitution judgment and civil judgment.

#### B. <u>Defendant LLCs Assets Are Debtor's Voidable Transfers of her Assets Hidden</u> in the Defendant LLCs

As held by U.S. Supreme Court, in *Husky International Electronic, Inc. v. Ritz* (2016) 578 U.S. 356, 359, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, there is a distinction between "false representation" and "actual fraud" for the purposes of 11 U.S.C §523(a)(2)(A), holding that "[t]he term 'actual fraud' in §523(a)(2)(A) encompasses forms of fraud, like fraudulent conveyance schemes, that can be effected without a false representation." The creditor bears the burden of proving the applicability of §523(a)(2)(A) by a preponderance of the evidence." *In re Sabban*, 600 F.3d at 1222, citing *Turtle Rock Meadows Homeowners Association v. Slyman (In re Slyman)*, 234 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2000).

Debtor has nearly 25 years of pro per litigation experience in Orange County Superior Court. Following her targeting of innocent people via pro per litigation, Plaintiff became a creditor of Debtor's and had a continuing lien on the condominium sublease under section 5.1 of the CC&Rs since July 2017, when Debtor cross-sued Plaintiff and the other Board members, for indemnification, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief under the governing documents falsely. Debtor claimed Plaintiff owned the 4476 Alderport condo and that Plaintiff had violated the governing documents causing the condo to be out of compliance with the CC&Rs. [See Paragraph 17, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

After enduring false claims and defending Debtor's out-of-control litigation tactics designed to hurt me and the other volunteer board members rather than prove a civil claim, Debtor lost her cross-complaint on demurrer. Debtor then dismissed her suit against Plaintiff and the other

Board members. Per the governing documents and state law, known as Davis-Stirling, Plaintiff as a Board member was entitled to attorney's fees and costs for defending herself against the Debtor's cross-suit in the Enforcement Lawsuit, which was filed on August 7, 2018. [See Paragraph 17, and related Ex. 12, p 451-454, *supra*, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

But for Debtor's blatant lie that Plaintiff owned 4476 Alderport condo and that Plaintiff did the violations forcing Plaintiff to spend legal fees in defense of her claims, through a settlement that she never intended to live up to, and then appealing the court's granting of the motion for attorney's fees based on the clock running out for a timely motion, shows that Debtor with her extensive pro per litigation experience planned to put Plaintiff and the other board members through spending more and more legal fees to cause financial harm, based on a claim that she knew was a lie.

If there was any truth to her claims, she could have provided evidence in discovery and tried to prove it via a trial on the merits. But, the truth is she knew it was a lie. Plaintiff has provided examples of Debtor's fraud in her continuous filings of unmeritorious ex parte motions, just like her purported fee simple ownership lie. The 2000 civil case proved these sublease interests as unalterable under contracts of adhesion, which do not include a fee interest in the ground. Furthermore, the standard 2003 Form for transferring ownership of the sublease was recorded on every unit, so Debtor and Mr. Nickel intentionally fabricate a different one that no license real estate agent, escrow agent or title company would ever do out of concern for fraud. This court was subjected to her litigation tactics in the main bankruptcy case as well regarding her false Covid-19 government rent funds grift. [See Paragraphs 21, 30, supra, and see related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Debtor's attempt to cause more legal fees via protracted litigation is shown by Debtor's statement in the November 1, 2018 transcript. Debtor immediately asked for an extension of time on the motion for the second time. Debtor could have begun by telling the court: "I sold the condo yesterday." Instead, she lied about it by omission, convincing the court by saying "I have to sell" that the court believed and thus continued the hearing for another week causing more legal fees.

[See Paragraphs 55, supra, and see related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, Jasso Decl.

| |¶7].

Plaintiff, as a volunteer board member, incurred the legal fees to defend Debtor's fraudulent cross-complaint for indemnification, apportionment of fault and declaratory relief, because Debtor never intended to prove any of her claims. She could not prove them because I did not own her condo and did not do anything in violation of the CC&Rs that she did. She just kept filing fraudulent pleadings that were denied or taken off calendar for fraud, while claiming without proof that she owned the common area in fee simple and that there was no HOA. Then, she lied to the court on November 1, 2018 causing more legal fees for additional appearances and preparation for the extended hearing. Vexatious litigation is basically litigation that is based on a person's intentional lies and induces the victim to defend oneself and spend legal fees and costs. That is what happened here. Debtor acted fraudulently by cross-suing Plaintiff in the enforcement lawsuit causing the legal fees debt based on her deceit in her cross-suit against Plaintiff.

# 1 The Defendant LLCs Assets Come from Debtor's First Voidable Transfer of Her Sole Substantial Asset, the 4476 Alderport Condo

Section 3439.04(a)(1) of the California Civil Code states:

A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is voidable as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation [...] (1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor.

A creditor can void as "actual fraud" any transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor if the debtor acted with "[w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor." Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(a)(1). Eleven (11) factors or "badges of fraud," are used to determine actual fraud, prompting courts to consider whether the transfer should be voided:

(1) The transfer or obligation was to an insider, (2) The debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer, (3) The transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed, (4) Before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit, (5) The transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets, (6) The debtor absconded, (7) The debtor removed or concealed assets, (8) The value of the consideration

received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred, (9) The debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, (10) The transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred, and (11) The debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienholder who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04(b).

Here, numerous badges of fraud are present with respect to the Pre-Petition Transfers.

After obtaining the debt by fraud, Debtor, on October 30, 2018 and again on October 31, 2018, transferred the 4476 Alderport condo to Mr. Nickel when Plaintiff already had an interest in the 4476 Alderport condo pursuant to the California Appellate Court, *Nagel v. Westen*, 59 Cal.App.5th 740 (2021) decision.

Mr. Nickel knew the 4476 Alderport condo was under litigation with the HOA and the board members. Mr. Nickel knew that the Plaintiff's and the other board members' motion for attorney's fees was scheduled on November 1, 2018. Mr. Nickel knew that the Board members' motion was asking more than \$50,000 and that the HOA had already incurred over \$250,000 based on the HOA's budget, the audited financials, and the Board minutes. [See Paragraphs 46, 53, 54, supra, and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, Jasso Decl. ¶ 7].

Mr. Nickel knew that the landlord, BS Investors, had started an Unlawful Detainer action against the Debtor on October 10, 2018 for outstanding HOA assessments and failure to comply with the state law resulting in numerous restraining orders against Debtor. [See Paragraphs 38, 73, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶ 7].

Mr. Nickel was aware that the HOA had approved recording a separate written lien on the 4476 Alderport condo for the outstanding assessments, as he admitted he received everything in black binders from the Debtor. [See Paragraphs 53, 73 supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Mr. Nickel has substantial real property sales and purchases with condominiums with HOA in California and operates a business called R. Nickel Properties LLC. Mr. Nickel used a real estate agent, escrow agent and title policy for his purchases *other than* the 4476 Alderport condo. (emphasis added). [See Paragraphs 47, 50, supra, and related exhibits, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Debtor created a fabricated assignment of the sublease document that gave Mr. Nickel he 4776 Alderport condo from Defendant JP LLC on October 30, 2018, for no consideration and no

transfer taxes paid. Debtor included a transfer of the remainder interest in the ground in fee simple in this document. The document does not match the landlord's required form, which was recorded on the unit in the 2003 First Amendment to the Condominium Sublease for 4476 Alderport condo and on each of the other 79 units. [See Paragraphs 81, 82, 83, supra, and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

On October 30, 2018, Debtor received \$379,000 in cashier's checks from Mr. Nickel at his bank within a few hours of meeting him, where they signed the papers, payable to Defendant JP LLC. [See Paragraph 42, supra, and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, Jasso Decl. ¶ 7].

On October 31, 2018, the eve of the motion for attorney's fees and after Debtor provided Mr. Nickel with all of the HOA documentation regarding all of the litigation which included litigation disclosure letters, HOA board minutes and the title and case number of all of the cases, the recorded governing documents that contain provisions for an ongoing lien on the condo unit at all times, all of the audited financial information, a preliminary title report that showed the actual parcels making up the 4476 Alderport condo unit which did not include a remainder interest in fee, the sublease and ground lease documents, Mr. Nickel agreed to enter into a second, modified transfer document that changed the name of the transferor from Defendant JP LCC to Debtor, Jamie L Gallian.

On October 31, 2018, Mr. Nickel gave Debtor two cashier's checks totaling \$379,000 payable to Jamie Gallian and re-signed the revised transfer document that again stated there was no consideration paid and no transfer taxes were paid to the OC County Recorder's office when it was recorded. Like the October 30, 2018 document, this transfer document included a transfer of a remainder interest in the ground in fee, which Debtor claimed in court that the condominiums are townhomes in a PUD and the fabricated transfer document to Mr. Nickel reflect the claim that the subleased condos were townhomes in a PUD, because Mr. Nickel subsequently sued the HOA and the board members claiming he has a fee ownership interest in the property in his verified complaint. [See Paragraphs 81, 82, 83, supra, and related exhibits incorporated herein, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Mr. Nickel and Debtor kept Mr. Nickel's identity and contact information concealed. Debtor lied to the state court about the sale by making the court believe that she was going to sell in the future, and only admitted the sale after the state court indicated it was ruling in favor of Plaintiff and the other board members. [See Paragraph 55, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

The HOA attorneys investigated the new owner to try to determine if he existed and have the HOA attorneys communicate with him to see if there was any truth to Debtor's surprise statements in court. The HOA attorney, Pejman Kharazzian, located him on November 5, 2018 and Mr. Nickel faxed over the October 30, 2018 transfer document and the front of the two October 31, 2018 cashier's checks as his proof of purchase as a purported bonafide purchaser for value. [See Paragraphs 57-58, supra, and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference Jasso Decl. ¶ 7].

If the property was owned in fee like townhomes in a PUD, which Mr. Nickel claims like Debtor, the 4476 Alderport condo was worth approximately \$600,000 in 2018. Therefore, Mr. Nickel did not intend to pay fair market value for the property and received a substantial discount off of the fair market value of the property. [See Paragraphs 22, 81, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7, and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference].

Mr. Nickel finally admitted that there was no purchase agreement, no escrow and no title policy for the Debtor-Nickel transfer of the condo, and that Mr. Nickel knew he should have done the transfer so fast and that it was against his better business sense. When I met Mr. Nickel shortly after emailing, he again shared his regret over the fast transfer and claimed Debtor required him to do the under-the-table transfer because of the motion for attorney's fees the next day. [See Paragraphs 67, 76, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶ 7 and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference].

Debtor admitted in her Answer to Plaintiff FAC ¶56 that in her Appellant's Opening Brief for her appeal of the approximately \$319,000 default judgment, that "rather than pay the judgments she owed, Debtor sold the condo to Mr. Nickel." [See Paragraph 71, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7 incorporated herein by reference; see also, FAC DK 6, ¶56, Debtor's Answer DK 13, ¶56; see also, Jasso Decl. ¶33, Ex. 22, p. 868, Appellant's Open Brief Part V., first full paragraph].

Debtor scheduled a retained interest in the property in her bankruptcy schedule by claiming a reversionary interest in APN 937-63-053, which is the APN number for the 4476 Alderport condo. [See Paragraph 56, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7, and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, and Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, p. 74, Item 34.4, p. 84, Item 34.3); FAC DK 6 ¶83].

The day of the transfer the Debtor owed over \$300,000 in potential judgments to the HOA, the Board members, TD Bank judgment, HOA outstanding assessments, unpaid property taxes and pending legal fees incurred by the landlord, BS Investors, for the UD action. Debtor also owed Bank of America \$3672.89, which combined with Debtor's Alliant Credit Union account equaled approximately \$1,118.11 as a combined total of Debtor's assets. *See* Paragraph 84, *supra*, Jasso Decl. ¶7 and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference].

Debtor paid property taxes on 4476 Alderport condo in December 2018, approximately 5 weeks after purportedly selling to Mr. Nickel, and the Orange County Tax Assessor's office continued to list Debtor as the owner of the condo through June 2019, the last time Plaintiff spoke with a government employee in that office and checked their computers. [See Paragraphs 61, 68, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7 and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference]

Based on Debtor's financial statement provided to the criminal court under oath, Debtor obtained a state public defender in February 2019 and again in August 2019 and court-appointed criminal appellate attorneys after the criminal court determined she was indigent. [See Paragraphs 63, 195, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7 and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference].

The Debtor and Mr. Nickel refused to trace the funds of the cashier's checks payable to Defendant JP LLC or to Debtor, that Mr. Nickel claims relate to his taking a concealed ownership interest in Debtor's or JP LLC's assets immediately prior to court-ordered judgments in favor of Plaintiff and other creditors. Debtor made motions, pleading the 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment to avoid the court-ordered debtor's examination of her assets and a bench warrant was issued to gain her compliance. *See* Paragraphs 94, 95, 193, 194, *supra*, Jasso Decl. ¶7 incorporated herein by reference].

The Debtor and Mr. Nickel committed a transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo in a concealed transfer without a purchase agreement, an escrow, a title policy, and with knowledge of

(a) the HOA creditor, Plaintiff creditor and the other creditors, (b) the ongoing Enforcement

Litigation and motions for attorney's fees, (c) Debtor's unpaid discovery sanctions, (d) Plaintiff's

unpaid HOA assessments and lien, (f) an ongoing Unlawful Detainer action against the Debtor by

assessments and failure to comply with state law as evidenced by the numerous restraining orders;

and (g) the Debtor's lack of other assets available to pay her debts, as she was already not paying

Alderport condo totaled \$1118.11. The transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo made her indigent as

several of her debts at the time of the transfer, because Debtor's assets apart from the 4476

determined by the criminal court in February 2019.

the Landlord of the 4476 Alderport condo defaulted sublease for failure to pay the unpaid HOA

and the other board members motion for attorney's fees of approximately \$50,000 (e) Debtor's

a. <u>There is No Defense to the Debtor-Nickel Transfer of the 4476</u>
Alderport condo defaulted sublease

Section 3439.08 of the California Civil Code states: A transfer or obligation is not voidable under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 3439.04, against a person that took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value given the debtor or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.

The Nautilus Court opinion appears to be the seminole case on CUVTA's good faith defense. The court held there are 4 possible ways to show there is no "good faith" defense: "After analyzing those state and federal cases, we hold a transferee cannot benefit from the good faith defense if that transferee had fraudulent intent, colluded with a person who was engaged in the fraudulent conveyance, actively participated in the fraudulent conveyance, **or** had *actual knowledge of facts showing knowledge of the transferor's fraudulent intent."* (the court added the emphasis). See Nautilus, Inc. v. Yang (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 33, 37 [217 Cal.Rptr.3d 458]. The *Nautilus* court held that a transferee does not take in good faith if the transferee had actual knowledge of facts showing the transferor had fraudulent intent." *Id.* at p. 46. The Court stated that "knowledge of facts rendering the transfer voidable would be inconsistent with the good faith

that is required of a protected transferee." *See Nautilus, Inc. v. Yang* (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 33, 46. In *Filip v. Bucurenciu*, 129 Cal. App. 4th 825 (2005), a spouse of debtor transferred property before a judgment against the debtor. She claimed the good faith defense under Section 3439.08(a). The appellate court disagreed with her and instead agreed with the lower's court findings of fact that the spouse knew about the litigation and the creditor's claim for damages and knew that a judgment "might be forthcoming" against the debtor. The appellate court held that "[t]ransfers made under those circumstances do not evidence good faith." *Id.* at p. 890.

Prior to Debtor filing for bankruptcy, the HOA cross-sued Mr. Nickel on the basis that the transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo was a CUVTA transfer.

Mr. Nickel admitted that he knew everything about the HOA ongoing litigation. Mr. Nickel actively participated in transferring the Debtor's sole substantial asset in a concealed transfer on the eve of Plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, without a purchase agreement, escrow or title policy and knowing there was an additional pending \$300,000 judgment for legal fees and cost and damages from the HOA. Mr. Nickel's substantial real estate purchase/sale experience in many escrows shows that he knew the benefit to Debtor of concealing the transfer meant that some of the proceeds of a transparent sale would go to Debtor's creditors. Despite his 'better sense of business' which includes decades of real estate transactions in California with at least 6 hoa condominiums, Mr. Nickel admitted in his email to Plaintiff in March 2019 that he intentionally concealed the purported purchase by deliberately doing a "rushed" transfer without an escrow, escrow agent or real estate agent, which helped Debtor avoid paying her judgment debts. Mr. Nickel claims he took the property for a purported \$379,000 when the fair market value of a townhome was \$600,000, which he believes he purchased at the time of the transfer and is now claiming a fee ownership interest. Therefore, there is no evidence that the Mr. Nickel would have

any basis for claim he took in good faith **and** for reasonably equivalent value. *See* Paragraph 47, 67, 73, 81 and related exhibits incorporated herein by reference, *supra*, Jasso Decl. ¶ 7].

Based on the facts and law as provided above, Plaintiff has met the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor-Nickel transfer of the 4476 Alderport condo sublease on October 31, 2018 was fraudulent conveyance scheme that both the Debtor and Mr. Nickel participated in to prevent the Debtor's creditors from collecting the debts owed from the asset, which is actual fraud as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Husky International Electronic, Inc. v. Ritz* (2016) 578 U.S. 356, 359, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, for the purposes of 11 U.S.C §523(a)(2)(A).

- 2. The Defendant LLCs, As Debtor's Alter-Egos, Acted at Debtor's Direction to

  Hide Transfers of Debtor's Cash from Mr. Nickel via Cashier's Checks in

  Violation of 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(2)(A)
  - a. <u>The Debtor's Transfers of Cash from Mr. Nickel via Cashier's Checks</u>

    <u>Payable to Defendant JSC LLC was Actual Fraud Pursuant to the</u>

    <u>Husky International Supreme Court Ruling.</u>

The Plaintiff and the HOA spent years trying to collect the Plaintiff's judgments, investigating the Debtor's assets. A bank levy resulted in no collection since the Plaintiff emptied the account. A wage garnishment was not possible because Debtor quit or was laid off from her job on March 15, 2020. Plaintiff recorded an abstract of judgment and UCC liens. Plaintiff investigated the Debtor-Nickel transfer and worked years to try and collect the judgments against the condominium via informal and formal mediation. That effort is still ongoing. The HOA requested a Debtor's ORAP exam in December 2020, which was finally scheduled by the court in March 2021 for June 3, 2021. The Debtor fought appearing for the exam claiming her 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment rights to avoid self-incrimination, claiming she was sick, having other cases to attend to in her constant pro per litigation with other targets. The court realized the delay tactic and order her to appear under a bench warrant on July 8, 2021. Debtor immediately filed for bankruptcy on July 9, 2021. HOA and Plaintiff asked Mr. Nickel to trace the funds he claimed were purchase

money for the 4476 Alderport condo, but he has refused multiple times. After Plaintiff filed the FAC, Plaintiff subpoenaed the financial records from third parties regarding Debtor and the Defendant LLCs, including Wells Fargo Bank, JP Morgan Chase Bank, Bank of America, Alliant Credit Union, Fidelity Investments, and real property records from Old Republic Title Company, the Secretary of State and the California Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). [See Paragraphs 94-102, supra, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

The records show that Debtor deposited \$366,600 into her new Chase PCS #7891 account on October 31, 2018 and emptying the account except for \$100 by November 3, 2021 via withdrawals of cash and online transfers totaling \$355,000 to her new Chase PCC #0186 account. [See Paragraphs 103-107, supra, related to Chase which provide in more detail each transfers of funds which take pages to describe and cite to Jasso Decl. with attached exhibits; Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Starting November 2, 2018, Debtor immediately wired funds to Brian Till and then obtained the wire funds back by November 5 2018. Debtor withdrew cash in the form of cashier's checks totaling \$155,000 payable to herself and deposited those checks in Defendant JSC LLC new Chase Acct #7860 opened on November 16, 2018, her personal Alliant Credit Union account, deposited into another new personal Chase Checking ending in #5315, and redepositing some funds back into this PCC #0186 account. Plaintiff created a chart attached to Jasso Decl. ¶43, Ex. 32. On November 7, 2018, Debtor withdrew \$175,000 in a cashier's check and deposited it into Defendant JSC LLC account. Debtor withdrew \$1,600 and deposited it into Debtor's personal Chase account ending in #5315, which she ten transferred \$500 of it to Defendant JSC LLC account #7860. Debtor then withdrew \$20,000 in cashier checks that Plaintiff has been unable to trace. By November 8, 2018, this account had a \$0 balance. [See Paragraphs 108-115, supra, incorporated here by reference; Jasso Decl. ¶7].

The Debtor then moved the \$355,000 of funds into the new Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860 account. Through an even more complex set of transfers over a long period of time, Debtor transferred funds into Defendant JSC LLC which she then withdrew the funds with stacks of cashier's checks, used the account to purchase personal items, deposited funds into an almost

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empty Fidelity IRA rollover account to wash the funds and pretend on her bankruptcy schedules that she had "qualified retirement" funds. These cashier's checks were used by the Debtor to purchase the Defendant JSC LLC's mobile home located at 16222 Monterey Lane, Spc 376, Huntington Beach, CA 92649 in another concealed transfer without an escrow, a purchase agreement or a title policy. On November 17, 2018, Debtor was able to transfer \$150,000 of Defendant JSC LLC's cashier's checks to Lisa Ryan who was the prior owner of the mobile home. Debtor took the remaining \$20,000 JSC LLC cashier's check and deposited it into her personal account and then redeposited the funds back into JSC LLC to create an \$18,000 cashier's check payable to Houser Bros Co. but then redeposited it into the JSC LLC Chase #7860 account to then send some of it to Fidelity along with cashier's check's from the November 3, 2018 withdrawal of personal funds that Plaintiff traced to the JSC LLC Chase #7860 account. Plaintiff has provided charts attached to Jasso Decl. as Exhibits 34 and 36 detailing Defendant JSC LLC's cashier's checks that could be traced. The funds were ultimately used for personal items, such as criminal bail, Albertson's and other grocery stores, cell phone, hair salon, Big Lots, CVS, restaurants, car payments, Alliant personal visa credit card, personal Home Depot account, personal Capital One credit card, appellate court record fees, personal attorney's fees, the IRS personal taxes, her United Airlines 401k loan payments, her personal medical insurance, withdrawals of cash, and a \$9,000 withdrawal in a cashier's check payable to Ron Pierpont, her ex-husband, on July 9, 2021, the date of the petition which left a balance of \$368.46 on the date of the petition. [See Paragraphs 116-163, supra which are incorporated here by reference; Jasso Decl. ¶7]. In Nagel v. Westen, 59 Cal.App.5th 740 (2021), the creditor sued the debtor under California's UVTA predecessor UFTA, but the findings of the appellate reference CUVTA. The case issue was whether a debtor's transfer of an asset could still be a fraudulent conveyance under CUVTA if the

debtor was both the transferor and transferee. The California appellate court agreed with the creditor that such a transfer was transfer subject to CUVTA, finding that:

"Section 3439.04(b) anticipates imaginative debtors will employ an array of tactics to evade payment obligations. For example, the trier of fact may look to whether "the transfer or obligation was to an insider"; "the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer"; or "the debtor removed or concealed assets." These badges of fraud indicate one's liability under the UVTA is not contingent upon recruiting conspirators. It may include situations in which the debtor "parts" with property without alienating ownership rights or possession. Further, the UVTA does not limit its enforcement measures to third parties. (See § 3439.07, subd. (a)(3)(C) [creditor may obtain avoidance, injunctive relief, receivership, or "[a]ny other relief the circumstances may require"].)" Id. at p. 750-751.

The Nagel court reviewed the California legislative history which considered that the terms in the UVTA should be analyzed from the perspective of the creditor, not the debtor, and thus a creditor has a potential interest to a debtor's property during litigation with the debtor which the UVTA protects:

"[A] creditor-debtor relationship can alter an owner's power over the property owned." (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill. No. 161 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) p. 1.) "Unsecured creditor-debtor relationships necessarily raise questions as to a creditor's rights and remedies when the debtor manipulates property to defeat the creditor's potential interest in that property." (*Ibid.*) It is not surprising the UVTA defines the term "asset" not from the debtor's perspective, but from that of a creditor with a potential interest in any property that could satisfy the underlying debt. (citations omitted). Id at p. 750.

The debtors in the *Nagel* case transferred their property at the closing stages of arbitration and thus the court found that the creditor's "interest had already arisen at the time of transfer." Id. at p. 750.

#### The court found that:

"Creating a bright line "third-party transferee" requirement would allow debtors to unilaterally extinguish this interest, and, it follows, their UVTA liability, by simply manipulating an asset's form or location without vesting legal title or ownership in a third party. This result would contravene the UVTA's stated purpose: "to prevent debtors from placing, beyond the reach of creditors, property that should be made available to satisfy a debt." (*Chen v. Berenjian, supra, 33* Cal.App.5th at p. 817.)

The Defendant JSC LLC is the alter-ego of the Debtor, as provided in Part IV.A, *supra*. Thus, the transfer of the funds to Defendant JSC LLC, which is effectively from the Debtor to the

Debtor in a different form, constitutes actual fraud as part of Debtor's continuation of her fraudulent transfer scheme with the money given to her by Mr. Nickel for the 4476 Alderport condo sublease.

Based on the facts and law as provided above, Plaintiff has met the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor-Defendant JSC LLC transfers of cash and cashier's check from November 3, 2018 through July 9, 2021 was a fraudulent conveyance scheme that both the Debtor and Defendant JSC LLC participated in to prevent the Debtor's creditors from collecting the debts owed from the assets, which is actual fraud as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Husky International Electronic, Inc. v. Ritz* (2016) 578 U.S. 356, 359, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, for the purposes of 11 U.S.C §523(a)(2)(A).

b. The Debtor's Transfers of \$75,000 of Cash She Received from Mr.

Nickel via Cashier's Checks via Deposit into Defendant JSC LLC, and

then \$96,000 of Funds Washed Through Debtor's Fidelity IRA

Rollover Account and then Transferred via a \$74,999 Cashier's Check

into Debtor new Bank of America JP LLC #1274 account, which was

Actual Fraud Pursuant to the Husky International Supreme Court

Ruling.

On August 16, 2019, after Debtor obtained another public defender in her ongoing criminal case, Debtor withdrew \$74,999 a cashier's check from Defendant JSC LLC payable to Defendant JP LLC to open the JP LLC BofA #1274 account. The funds came about after Debtor hid \$96,000 in Defendant JSC LLC Chase #7860 account that originated from the \$355,000 deposited into Debtor's PCC #0186 account. The details are described in Paragraphs 131, 132, 137 and 138 incorporated here by reference. [Jasso Decl. ¶7]. Debtor then began a series of large withdrawals of cash from August 16, 2019 through July 9, 2021, thousands of dollars a month spent each month on personal items including cable tv, Macy's, restaurants, pet food, payments to her personal Capital One credit card, sporting goods, groceries, funds sent to one of her sons,

dwindling the account down to \$2454.20 on July 9, 2021 and did not schedule this amount as her personal funds. [See Paragraphs 164-174, supra, incorporated here by reference; Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Like the Defendant JSC LLC, the Defendant JP LLC is the alter-ego of the Debtor, as provided in Part IV.A, *supra*. Thus, the transfer of the funds from Defendant JSC LLC to Defendant JP LLC, which is effectively from the Debtor to the Debtor in a different form, constitutes actual fraud as part of Debtor's continuation of her fraudulent transfer scheme with the money given to her by Mr. Nickel for the 4476 Alderport condo sublease. *See* California Code Section 3439.04(a) and *Nagel v. Westen*, 59 Cal.App.5th 740 (2021), as provided in detail in Part IV.B.1 and Part IV.B.2, *supra*.

Based on the facts and law as provided above, in Part IV.B.1 and Part IV.B.2, *supra*, Plaintiff has met the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor-Defendant JSC LLC-Defendant JP LLC transfers of cash and cashier's check from November 3, 2018 through July 9, 2021 was a fraudulent conveyance scheme that the Debtor and Defendant JSC LLC and Defendant JP LLC participated in to prevent the Debtor's creditors from collecting the debts owed from the assets, which is actual fraud as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, in *Husky International Electronic, Inc. v. Ritz* (2016) 578 U.S. 356, 359, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, for the purposes of 11 U.S.C §523(a)(2)(A).

c. The Debtor's Defendant JP LLC January 2019 'perfect lien' on the
Mobile Home Based on Transfers of \$225,000 of Cash Originating
from Mr. Nickel via Cashier's Checks Payable to Defendant JSC LLC
for Personal Expenses, While Making Defendant JP LLC the lienholder
on the Defendant JSC LLC Mobile Home was Actual Fraud Pursuant
to the Husky International Supreme Court Ruling.

The Debtor moved almost all of the \$379,000 of funds received from Mr. Nickel on October 31, 2018 through Defendant JSC LLC for personal expenses. Thousands of dollars of cash and cashier's check were untraceable.

The Debtor claims she made a loan to Defendant JSC LLC to operate what she has admitted in DK 29 Corporate Ownership Statement a nonexistent business, secured by Defendant JSC LLC's mobile home asset. Debtor then created a lienholder interest in Defendant JSC LLC via a UCC lien and a HCD lien in favor of Defendant JP LLC. Debtor admitted that no payments were ever made on the promissory note. [See FAC DK ¶50; see also Paragraphs 182-191 incorporated here by reference; Jasso Decl. ¶7].

Based on the Schedule A/B, Item 19, Debtor states "J-Pad, LLC Holder of Security Agreement, dated 11/16/18, Promissory Note (\$175,000 & \$88,000). Matures 2048." [Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, pp. 53, 97]. This lien is also a fraudulent conveyance scheme because Debtor, in using her alter-ego Defendant LLCs, she is basically lending herself money by putting the money into Defendant JSC LLC to use for personal expenses, putting a lien on the mobile home asset she hid in JSC LLC based on the purported loan, and the Defendant JP LLC's holder of security lien is basically an added layer of preventing the collection of the mobile home by creditors.

In analyzing CUVTA regarding transfers where the debtor is both the transferor and the transferee, the *Nagel* court analyzed a California case, *PGA West Residential Assn., Inc. v. Hulven Internat., Inc.* (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 156, 174 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 353] (*PGA West*) relevant here:

"PGA West, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th 156 presented the Fourth District with a situation similar in concept (if not fact) to ours. Debtor recorded a deed of trust on his condominium. He named an unincorporated sham entity as the deed's beneficiary and then foreclosed to insulate his equity from a creditor's claims. Many years later the creditor tried to avoid the UVTA's seven-year period of repose by arguing a transfer did not occur until debtor incorporated the sham entity. Prior to then, the creditor argued, debtor had effectively given a property interest to himself. The Fourth District declined to adopt the creditor's rigid characterization of the term "transfer" by focusing on the legal distinctions between the debtor and the purported transferee. The debtor's intent to insulate his assets and defraud creditors brought the transaction within the UVTA. (See PGA West, at p. 174 ["although Mork never incurred a real obligation to Hulven under the deed of trust and note, and Hulven apparently never really existed as a corporate entity, Mork's fraudulent attempt to transfer the equity in his condominium to Hulven to insulate that asset from

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27 28 potential creditors constitutes a 'transfer' as defined in section 3439.01, subdivision (m)"].)" Nagel v. Westen, 59 Cal. App. 5th 740, 751 (2021)

The Nagel court agreed finding that "the creditor's interests should drive the court's interpretation of the term "transfer" rather than the form of debtors' asset manipulations." *Ibid.* 

Here, Debtor incorporated Defendant JSC LLC and Defendant JP LLC as single member California limited liability companies prior to creating the lien on Defendant JSC LLC's assets on 11/16/18 and perfecting it on January 14, 2019 making Defendant JP LLC the lienholder, which was another fraudulent conveyance scheme transfer from Debtor to Defendant JP LLC of her lienholder interest on the mobile home.

Based on the facts and law as provided above, in Part IV.B.1 and Part IV.B.2, supra, Plaintiff has met the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the Debtor-Defendant JP LLC transfer of a lienholder interest in the mobile home on November 16, 2018 and perfected on January 14, 2019 was a fraudulent conveyance scheme that the Debtor and Defendant JSC LLC and Defendant JP LLC participated in to prevent the Debtor's creditors from collecting the debts owed from the assets, which is actual fraud as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, in Husky International Electronic, Inc. v. Ritz (2016) 578 U.S. 356, 359, 136 S.Ct. 1581, 1586, for the purposes of 11 U.S.C §523(a)(2)(A).

C. Debtor Was Asked in her August 8, 2021 341 Hearing to Produce Records that Show the Flow of the \$379,000 Funds from Mr. Nickel Which Would Have Shown Her Fraudulent Transfer Scheme Using the Defendant LLCs as her Alter-Egos and Would Have Saved Plaintiff Months of Time, Money and Work to Trace the Funds Which Also Proved Her False Oaths With the Intent to Hide Collectible Assets from Creditors and the Trustee.

Section 727(a)(3) denies a chapter 7 discharge when "the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions

might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of

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the case." 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3). This requires debtors to "produce records that provide enough 2 information to ascertain the debtor's financial condition and track his financial dealings with 3 substantial completeness and accuracy for a reasonable period past to present." Union Planters 4 Bank, N.A. v. Connors, 283 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2002). A creditor does "not need to prove that 5 the debtor intended to defraud them in order to demonstrate a § 727(a)(3) violation." *In re Scott*, 172 6 F.3d 959, 969 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting *In re Juzwiak*, 89 F.3d 424, 430 (7th Cir. 1996)). Where a 7 debtor is "sophisticated in business, and carr[ies] on a business involving significant assets, creditors 8 9 have an expectation of greater and better record keeping." Union Planters Bank, 283 F.3d at 899 10 (quoting *Scott*, 172 F.3d at 970). 11

The language of the statute "places an affirmative duty on the debtor to create books and records accurately documenting his business affairs." Scott, 172 F.3d at 969 (citing Juzwiak, 89 F.3d at 429).

On August 18, 2021, Debtor was asked to produce the records that traced the funds of the \$379,000 received from Mr. Nickel, as follows:

"O. On the schedules, on the petition date it was held in J-Sandcastle; is that correct? A.Yes, it is. Q. Okay. And did you ever transfer money to J-Sandcastle for it to purchase the property or did you pay Ms. Ryan directly and just put title in the name of J-Sandcastle? A. No, I did transfer money to J-Sandcastle. Q. And then it was the one that purchased the cashier's check from Ms. Ryan? A. I don't recall at this time. I wasn't prepared to answer that question. I'd have to go back. I do have records of the cashier's checks that were given to Ms. Ryan for the purchase of her home. Q. We would ask that you produce those records to the trustee that show the flow of funds of the \$379,000." [See Jasso Decl. ¶83, Ex. 72, p.1540-1541, (deposition p. 9, line 18 – p.10, line 9].

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Debtor never provided any financial or corporate records tracing the \$379,000. Plaintiff's months of discovery effort of the Debtor's alter-ego Defendant LLCs and having forensic accounting performed to trace the Debtor's assets through the stacks of cashier's checks in and out of several banks and financial investment institution are shown in this brief, Paragraphs 1-204 and financial records attached as exhibits to the Jasso Decl. in support of this brief. It took a huge amount of time and effort, due to the amount of cashier's checks and lack of corporate documents tracing the transfer and use of the funds.

In Plaintiff's FAC, Plaintiff properly alleged that Debtor, in her operation of her various businesses, including Defendants JP LLC and JSC LLC operated these businesses as her alter egos since October 18, 2018, seeking to shield herself from personal liability while at the same time using funds of these businesses for personal purposes. [FAC DK 6 ¶91].

In addition, during the time period immediately after the civil judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff, Debtor claimed to be indigent in Criminal court, but also claimed she made six-figure loans to her LLCs, including, but not limited to, \$225,000 financing loan to her J-Sandcastle Co LLC, and a note promissory note held by J-Pad LLC, which was owned for some time by Debtor and J-Sandcastle Co LLC, and Debtor's former husband, all of which without any independently verifiable documents tracing any of the funds. [FAC DK 6 ¶92].

In addition, Debtor claimed in her bankruptcy documents provided to the Bankruptcy

Trustee that she received two cashier's checks from Mr. Nickel on October 30, 2018 payable to JP

for a total of \$379,000, and again on October 31, 2018 for a total of \$379,000 payable to Debtor.

Debtor also claimed that the JP cashier's checks were rescinded. However, since a bank's rescission of a cashier's check can take up to 90 days and Debtor did not provide proof of tracing those funds back to Mr. Nickel, Debtor appears to be hiding the funds from the cashier's checks in business or personal bank, life insurance or investment accounts since 2018. [FAC DK 6 ¶94].

Plaintiff believes the purpose of accurate schedules and the 341a hearing requests to the Debtor is to help the creditors and the Trustee easily evaluate the Debtor's and the Defendant LLCs financial information Due to Debtor's failure to produce the tracing of the funds that showed the continuous concealed transfer of funds and the use of the funds to pay Debtor's personal expenses through her alter-ego Defendant LLCs, Plaintiff had to expend extensive amounts of time, money and effort to learn that the Defendant LLCs participated in an extensive fraudulent transfer scheme to prevent, hinder or delay the Plaintiff's ability to collect the civil and criminal judgments. Thus, the failure to produce the financial and corporate records should be considered a denial of discharge under the facts and circumstances in this case under 11. U.S.C. §727(a)(3).

## D. <u>Defendant LLCs Assets Were Used by Debtor to Create False Oaths With the</u> <u>Intent to Hide Collectible Assets from Creditors and the Trustee.</u>

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C 727(a)(4)(A), a debtor shall not receive a discharge if "the debt knowing and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case—made a false oath or account." *See Retz v. Samson (In Re Retz)*, 606 F.3d 1189, 1200 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2010).

To prevail on a § 727(a)(4)(A) claim, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: a. The debtor made a false oath in connection with the case, b. The oath related to a material fact, c. The oath was made knowingly, and d. The oath was made fraudulently. *Retz v. Samson (In re Retz)*, 606 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir. 2010); *Roberts v. Erhard (In re Roberts)*, 331 B.R. 876, 882 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). The "fundamental purpose" of § 727(a)(4)(A) is to ensure that the trustee and creditors have "accurate information without having to conduct costly investigations." *In re Retz*, 606 F.3d at 1196. "Materiality" is broadly defined. *Roberts v. Erhard (In re Roberts)*, 331 B.R. 876, 883 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). A fact is "material" if it "bears a relationship to the debtor's business transactions or estate, or concerns the discovery of assets, business dealings, or the existence and disposition of the debtor's property." *Retz v. Samson (In re Retz)*, 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). An omission or misstatement that "detrimentally affects administration of the estate" is material. *Id*. A false statement or omission may be material

even without "direct financial prejudice to creditors." *In re Roberts*, 331 B.R. at 883. 39. A debtor acts "knowingly" if he or she acts "deliberately and consciously." Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1198 (9th Cir. 2010). A demonstration of fraudulent intent requires a showing that: 1) The debtor made the representations (e.g., a false statement or omission in the schedules); 2) At the time the debtor knew they were false; and 3) The debtor made them with intention and purpose of deceiving the creditors. Retz v. Samson (In re Retz), 606 F.3d 1189, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 2010). Intent is usually proven by circumstantial evidence or inferences drawn from the debtor's conduct. Id. at 1199. 42. "Reckless indifference or disregard for the truth" may be circumstantial evidence of intent. Id. See also, Khalil v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co. (In re Khalil), 379 B.R. 163 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007). The existence of "more than one falsehood, together with a debtor's failure to take advantage of the opportunity to clear up all inconsistencies and omissions, such as when filing amended schedules, can be found to constitute reckless indifference to the truth satisfying the requisite finding of intent to deceive." Ravasia v. U.S. Tr. (In re Ravasia), 2021 Bankr.LEXIS 1033, at \*18 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2021). Debtor signed her Chapter 7 Petition, Bankruptcy Schedules, Statements of Financial Affairs and other documents file with the Court under penalty of perjury, acknowledging that the

information provided therein was true and correct, even though she knew some of the information provided was not true or correct

At her initial 341(a) meeting of creditors, under penalty of perjury, Debtor answered in the affirmative that she signed, read and was personally familiar with the petition, schedules, state of financial affairs and related documents, and that there were no errors or omissions, except the current title document for the JSC LLC mobile home. Debtor nevertheless made several material omission and false oaths.

> 1. Debtor Changed Her Schedules and Testified About Her Change of Ownership Interest in her alter-ego Defendant JP LLC Without Accounting For the Change, Causing Creditors to Spend An Unfair Amount of Time and Resources to Determine the Truth of Her Assets.

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Plaintiff and the HOA had to spend time and resources investigating Defendant JP LLC long

before she filed for bankruptcy. Plaintiff found nothing other than the Statement of Information

checks payable to JP LLC, but both Chase bank and Wells Fargo Bank could not locate any

filed with the Secretary of State. Mr. Nickel allowed the HOA to request the back of the cashier's

information tracing the funds. In Debtor's deposition she refused to provide the names of any other

members of JP LLC after she lied saying she was not the sole owner. In her 341a hearing, Debtor

Defendant JP LLC are different "depending on who you ask today". [Jasso Decl. ¶83, Ex. 72, p.

1542, p. 14, lines 3-8 of the 341a Hearing 08.18.21, see also Jasso Decl. ¶7, Paragraphs 189-190,

basically played a game of hide and seek with all the creditors by stating that the members of

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Supra.}
On Debtor's Schedule A/B, she stated that she originally held a 1/3 interest in JP.

interest without accounting for the change in interest/value. [FAC DK 6 ¶¶66, 101].

Debtor was asked to give the Trustee an accounting in the 341a hearing, but she never did.

Subsequently, Debtor stated that she held a 1/7 interest in JP. Debtor then claimed a 70% ownership

The Debtor did not account for the change of ownership interest in Defendant JP LLC. In fact, Debtor's changes made the ownership interest seem nominal when she scheduled the amount of the ownership as 1/7<sup>th</sup>. But, then she changed it again to 70% and then changed it again to 33%. [Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, pp.38-41, Column 4.]. By continuing to change the ownership percentage every few weeks, Plaintiff decided to amend her complaint, add Defendant JP LLC, and then spend months of effort and thousands of dollars in discovery to uncover the truth of the ownership and what assets, if any, Debtor really had in Defendant JP LLC. Months later, in March 2022, Debtor finally filed the required corporate ownership statement, DK 29, admitting that she owned 100% of Defendant JP LLC since October 18, 2018 and terminated the LLC after Plaintiff served the Defendant JP LLC with the FAC. Debtor could have simply said many times, starting with her April 20, 2021 Deposition with the HOA: "I am the sole owner of JP LLC." Plaintiff has to spend money to get help with the attached exhibits to the Jasso Decl. which show Debtors pattern of using cashier's checks and wires between her alter-ego, Defendant LLCs, that she used to hide years of fraudulent transfers. *See* Part IV.B, and the related reference Paragraphs, above.

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2. <u>Debtor used her alter-ego Defendant JSC LLC to Create And Schedule a</u>

<u>Retirement Account Asset in the Amount of \$7252.21, by Transferring</u>

<u>Funds Debtor Received from Mr. Nickel to JSC LLC Chase #7860 account</u>

<u>Which Debtor Then, through Defendant JSC LLC, Transferred to Debtor's</u>

<u>personal Fidelity IRA Rollover Account #169-638064.</u>

As provided in more detail in Paragraphs 175-181 incorporated herein by reference [Jasso Decl. ¶7], on April 30, 2019, Debtor's personal Fidelity IRA rollover account #169-638064 had a balance of \$75.89. After a wire transfer from Defendant JSC LLC to this Fidelity account on May 13, 2019, this account had \$96,156.30. Then, in August 2019, all but approximately \$7,300 was wired back to Defendant JSC LLC. Paragraphs 111, 131 and 132 along with Chart 32 details the tracing of the funds from Debtor's personal PCC #0186 account opened with funds from the cashier's checks from Mr. Nickel totaling \$379,000 through the transfer to Fidelity on May 13, 2019, demonstrates that the funds are not qualified retirement plan funds. The balance of the Fidelity IRA rollover account was \$7252.21 on July 1, 2021. Debtor scheduled in her original bankruptcy petition and subsequent amendments of Schedule A/B, Item 21 that this amount, estimated at \$7400, was retirement or pension account. [Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1 pp. 53, 64, 72, 113, 124, Item 21]. The scheduling of these funds as asset a qualified retirement plan money is a false oath. By washing the Debtor's asset of funds from Mr. Nickel through Defendant JSC LLC and then through a Fidelity IRA account, Debtor intentionally lied to create a non-exempt asset. The only amount that could possibly be schedule as a qualified IRA rollover amount is \$75.89. By using Defendant JSC LLC, the Debtor fabricated a potential exempt asset to prevent the creditors, including the Trustee, from knowing the truth about the funds.

3. <u>Debtor used Defendant JSC LLC to Transfer a \$14002 Distribution From</u>

<u>Debtor's 401k Plan Account And Then Lied About the Transfer on</u>

Schedule 107 Within 1 Year of Filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Protection.

As provided in Paragraph 155, *supra*, on July 27, 2020, <u>within 1 year prior to the bankruptcy petition date</u>, Debtor took a taxable distribution of her United Airlines 401k plan account balance in the amount of \$14,002.53, which immediately changed the qualified retirement

Chase #7860 account. Debtor scheduled \$31,922.58 as retirement plan income from a defaulted 401k loan, which, if true, would have solely been income "on paper" without any actual money distributed to Debtor. Debtor's Fidelity 401k plan records as wells as Debtor's Defendant JSC LLC July 2020 bank statements, clearly shows that Debtor lied on her bankruptcy petition, DK 1, DK 15, DK 16, DK 38, DK 72, Schedule 107, Part 2, Item 5. [Jasso Decl. ¶83, Ex. 72 p. (341a hearing testimony), and ¶67, Ex. 56, pp. 1174, 1185 (Chase #7860 July 2020, Fidelity 401k July 23, 2020 Payment Statement), *see also* Paragraph 155, *supra*, Jasso Decl. ¶7].

plan money to Debtor's personal assets. Debtor hid the \$14,002.53 in the Defendant JSC LLC

By taking a taxable distribution from a qualified retirement plan and commingling it with Defendant JSC LLC, the Debtor used the Defendant JSC LLC to make a false oath about the existence of actual cash funds available for the Trustee to collect, which she knew at the time of scheduling her assets that this portion of the 401k funds was an actual distribution of cash and not just a unpaid 401k loan on paper.

Debtor amended her schedules *nine* (9) times. [Jasso Decl. ¶11, Ex. 1, pp. 49-140]. The Courts have not given much credence to Debtors who amend their schedules after they are sued for a denial of discharge for false oaths. In *In re Gonzalez*, 553 B.R. 467 (E.D. New York 2016) the Court state that a debtor's act of amending his schedules and related documents can be used to establish that the statements in the original petition were false....A debtor's disclosure of information previously omitted from the schedules is some evidence of innocent intent, but this inference is slight where the debtor has amended his schedules after the trustee or creditors have already discovered what the debtor sought to hide." Id. at p. 474. Here, Debtor's used her alteregos to hide assets that may be available for the Trustee to collect on behalf of the creditors.

These funds could have been used to pay Debtor's debts to Plaintiff, but instead she hid them in

her alter-ego, Defendant JSC LLC, and used them for personal expenses preventing Plaintiff from

collecting available assets.

Plaintiff and the other Board members have tried for years to collect on the judgments. When the Debtor was finally required to sit for a debtor's examination and produce documents about her assets, she claimed she had to plead the 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment, she claimed she was ill, and she claimed she was too busy with her other pro per litigation cases against new targets. As a result of the court being done with her excuses, the court issued a bench warrant. Rather than comply with the debtor's examination laws and court orders, Debtor filed for bankruptcy and began lying on her schedules about her assets. Further, Debtor knew that she was using Defendant JSC LLC to funnel funds to and from retirement accounts because she had been doing it for years as part of her pattern of behavior. Debtor failed to correct her schedules for the false claims regarding these assets. This shows a reckless disregard for the truth as part of her pattern of using the Defendant JSC LLCs to hide and deceiving creditors and the Trustee to prevent the collection of assets. Therefore, the court should find that Debtor's use of her alter-ego, Defendant JSC LLC to lie about IRA and 401k plan assets which were false oaths under 11 U.S.C. §727(a)(4).

#### V. CONCLUSION

Debtor ultimately admitted that Defendant LLCs are her 100% owned, single-member limited liability companies that did not do any business since their inception on October 18, 2018. [See FAC ¶44, Dk 29]. There is substantial evidence of a unity of interest between Debtor and the Defendant LLCs and failing to add the Defendant LLCs to the judgments would create an unjust result. Therefore, based on the Plaintiff's FAC DK 6, this Brief in support of the Motion for Default Judgments of Defendant J-Sandcastle Co LLC and Defendant J-Pad, LLC and attached Declaration of Janine Jasso in support of this Motion, Plaintiff requests the Court find (1) that the Defendant LLCs are the alter-egos of Debtor, (2) that the corporate veils of the Defendant LLCs

are pierced as a reverse-veil piercing and (3) add the Defendant LLCs as debtors to Plaintiff's two

judgments. Plaintiff requests this equitable resolution provided under California case law as part of this default judgment. See, Curci Investments, LLC v. Baldwin (2017) 14 Cal. App. 5th 214, 221, 221 Cal.Rptr.3d 847 ("Curci"). This would permit Plaintiff to collect the judgments against any Defendant LLCs' assets that are not related to the bankruptcy estate. Please note, Plaintiff is in contact with the Trustee's counsel to ensure that Plaintiff will not improperly collect non-abandoned bankruptcy estate assets and will continue communication with the Trustee's counsel. [Jasso Decl. ¶6]. 

In addition, Plaintiff requests findings of facts related to the Defendant LLCs acts in connection with or on behalf of Debtor as they relate to Plaintiff's FAC Claims 2-5, which prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Debtor used the Defendant LLCs to do specific acts with her assets that should result in non-dischargeability of Plaintiff's civil judgment under Section 523(a)(2)(A) as well as the denial of Debtor's discharge under Sections 727(a)(3), 727(a)(4) and 727(a)(5).

Josev

DATED: December 29, 2022

### PROOF OF SERVICE OF DOCUMENT

I am over the age of 18 and not a party to this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding. My business address is: 7101 N. Mesa, Ste 355 El Paso, TX 79912

A true and correct copy of the foregoing document entitled: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT UNDER LBR 7055-1 will be served or was served (a) on the judge in chambers in the form and manner required by LBR 5005-2(d); and (b) in the manner stated below:

1. TO BE SERVED BY THE COURT VIA NOTICE OF ELECTRONIC FILING (NEF): Pursuant to controlling General Orders and LBR, the foregoing document will be served by the court via NEF and hyperlink to the document. On (date) 12/30/2022 , I checked the CM/ECF docket for this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding and determined that the following persons are on the Electronic Mail Notice List to receive NEF transmission at the email addresses stated below: See NEF for confirmation of electronic transmission to the U.S. trustee, any trustee in this case, and to any attorneys who receive service by NEF. Service information continued on attached page 2. SERVED BY UNITED STATES MAIL: On (date) 12/30/2022 , I served the following persons and/or entities at the last known addresses in this bankruptcy case or adversary proceeding by placing a true and correct copy thereof in a sealed envelope in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, and addressed as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that mailing to the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is filed. DEBTOR AND DEFENDANT DEFENDANT J-PAD, LLC DEFENDANT J-SANDCASTLE CO LLC JAMIE LYNN GALLIAN ROBERT L MCLELLAND, CEO RONALD J PIERPONT, CEO 16222 MONTEREY LANE, SPC 376 16222 MONTEREY LANE, SPC 376 16222 MONTEREY LANE, SPC 376 HUNTINGTON BEACH, CA 92649 **HUNTINGTON BEACH, CA 92649 HUNTINGTON BEACH, CA 92649** Service information continued on attached page 3. SERVED BY PERSONAL DELIVERY, OVERNIGHT MAIL, FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION OR EMAIL (state method for each person or entity served): Pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 5 and/or controlling LBR, on (date) 12/30/2022 , I served the following persons and/or entities by personal delivery, overnight mail service, or (for those who consented in writing to such service method), by facsimile transmission and/or email as follows. Listing the judge here constitutes a declaration that personal delivery on, or overnight mail to, the judge will be completed no later than 24 hours after the document is The Honorable Scott Clarkson, USBC, 411 West Fourth Stree, Santa Ana, CA, 92701 Courtesy copy: Aaron deLeest, adeleest@danninggill.com Service information continued on attached page I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true and correct. David Jasso 12/30/2022 Date Printed Name